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Transnational War in Syria 
The Eisenhower Doctrine in the 21st Century? 
 
JÖRG MICHAEL DOSTAL 
 
 
 
Introduction: The History of US Geopolitical Strategy 
in the Middle East 
 
 This article aims to explain the geopolitical interests of the United 
States (US) in the Middle East. The ongoing conflict in Syria since March 2011 
is used as a case study in order to explore US strategy. It is argued here that the 
Syrian conflict can only be understood by looking at global, regional, and local 
factors over longer periods of time. Thus, in order to identify intellectual 
forerunners of the post-WW2 conduct of the US in the Middle East, one needs 
to turn to geopolitical theorists broadly associated with the realist tradition in 
international relations. In this context, the writings of Dutch-born Yale 
University Professor Nicholas J. Spykman (1893-1943) deserve particular 
attention. Spykman developed his views about future US strategy after an 
expected victory in WW2 against the background of earlier geopolitical 
theorists of sea power, namely Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1914), and of land 
power, namely Sir Halford Mackinder (1861-1947).  
In contrast to the former two authors, Spykman argued that US 
“security” could no longer be guaranteed by focusing on regional defense, such 
as in concepts of a western hemisphere, or concerns with the relative dominance 
of either sea power or land power, such as in the relative geopolitical advantage 
of the US as the leading sea power or of Russia (between 1924 and 1991 the 
Soviet Union) as the leading land power. Instead, Spykman suggested that 
future US policymakers would have to integrate sea-, land- and air power in 
order to advance a truly global system of American defense. This would mean 
the removal of positions of influence of competing powers – including those of 
countries allied with the US – and the construction of a permanent network of 
military bases to extend US military power to every part of the world.  
The global US strategy advanced by Spykman and implemented after 
WW2 must be understood in the context of the traditional realist concern with 
regional balances of power, particularly in Europe. As an external balancer, the 
US shared many earlier British concerns but intervened in Europe from the 
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outside. This was well-put in Spykman’s statement that “[w]e have an interest 
in the European balance as the British have an interest in the continental 
balance”1. Moreover, Spykman shared with Mackinder the fear that land powers 
of Eurasia, especially Russia and Germany, might form an alliance that would 
exclude sea powers, i.e. the US and the United Kingdom (UK), from effective 
intervention on the Eurasian “world island” (Mackinder’s term) with Russia at 
its core2.  
From Spykman’s point of view, the US had to be concerned about any 
combination of state alliances in Eurasia and elsewhere that would exclude the 
US from direct access to a region. This concern was particularly pertinent in 
view of the coastal regions of Eurasia where most of the global population and 
economic activity was located in the mid-1940s and is still located today. In 
addition, Mackinder considered it possible and Spykman considered it likely 
that China would emerge in the long run as the leading power in Asia, which 
would constitute another future challenge to US policymakers. Thus, Spykman 
agreed with Mackinder’s earlier analysis that the territories that separated 
Russia from the maritime regions, namely Scandinavia, Western and Central 
Europe, North Africa, the Middle East, and East Asia including China, were of 
the highest significance in any global strategy and should be under the effective 
control of the US in cooperation with local allies. 
From the US point of view, the “rimland” (Spykman’s term) or 
“inner/marginal crescent” (Mackinder’s terms), that reached from Scandinavia 
via Central Europe, Turkey, the Arab states, Central Asia, and India toward 
Indochina, Korea, and North and East China – surrounding Russia as the 
leading land power – had to be controlled by advancing regional balances of 
power that included the US as the major external balancer. According to 
Spykman, concern with the “Eurasian Conflict Zones” suggested that “the 
United States is obliged to safeguard her position by making certain that no 
overwhelming power is allowed to build itself up in these areas”3. Thus, 
effective veto power in every geopolitical theater, and especially the “rimland”, 
was required to allow the US to gain and maintain global hegemony4.  
                                                 
1
  N.J. Spykman, America’s Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance 
of Power, Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York, 1942, p. 124. 
2
  H.J. Mackinder, “The Geographical Pivot of History”, The Geographical Journal, vol. 23, 
no. 4, 1904, pp. 421-437/436. 
3
  N.J. Spykman, The Geography of the Peace, Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York, 
1944, p. 51. 
4
  Spykman’s 1944 pamphlet includes a Map 46 (p. 52) displaying potential future conflict 
zones between sea power and land power titled “Heartland versus Rimland”. The map 
focuses on a ring of states in relative proximity to the borders of Russia/the Soviet Union 
and includes in the Middle East zone Syria, Turkey, Iran, Kuwait, and Jordan. The very 
same map could also be utilized to characterize the main conflict zones between the US 
and Russia in today’s world. 
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In Spykman’s words, the US main political objective must be “to 
prevent the unification of the Old World centers of power in a coalition hostile 
to her own interests….Balanced power on the Eurasian Continent is one of the 
objectives for which we are fighting and the establishment of such equilibrium 
and its preservation will be our objective when the fight is won”5. The crucial 
point, therefore, is to construct and maintain regional state systems that are 
always internally divided in ways that favor external balancing by the US. From 
the US perspective, this is a preventive measure to “make up for the 
fragmentation and tensions of the European and Asian state systems within a 
global balanced system, in which the relatively weaker position of neighbors or 
alliance partners is in the national interest of the USA”6.  
Turning now to the analysis of Middle Eastern affairs, Spykman’s 
strategy was implemented at the regional level as follows. After the end of 
WW2, the US initiated a step-by-step hegemonic transition away from the 
earlier Anglo-French system of regional control. The earlier system, i.e. the 
Sykes-Picot Franco-British diplomatic agreement of 1916 that divided the 
Middle East into French and British zones of influence, was transformed7. In 
the first step, the US formed an alliance with the UK to block the re-entry of 
France into the Middle East. At least partially due to this Anglo-American 
alliance, Arab nationalists successfully fought off Charles de Gaulle’s efforts to 
restore a French military presence in Syria and Lebanon between 1945 and 
1946. The country’s subsequent role as the main military supplier of Israel 
                                                 
5
  N.J. Spykman, The Geography…cit., p. 45 and p. 60. See also G.J. Martin, America’s 
Geography and Geographers. Toward Geographical Science, Oxford University Press, 
New York, 2015, pp. 862-863. 
6
  S. Fröhlich, Amerikanische Geopolitik. Von den Anfängen bis zum Ende des Zweiten 
Weltkrieges, Landsberg am Lech, Olzog, 1998, author’s translation (all subsequent 
German language sources translated by the author). Idealist critics of realism might argue 
against this proposition that US President Franklin D. Roosevelt pursued a multipolar 
world order on account of his rhetoric about the “four policemen”, which stood in 
Roosevelt’s discourse during WW 2 for the leading role that the US, UK, Soviet Union, 
and nationalist China were supposed to jointly assume after the end of WW2 in terms of 
the policing of regional zones of influence. However, Roosevelt was in practice not 
concerned about existing spheres of influence of the competing powers (e.g. his alliance 
with King Saud of Saudi Arabia was advanced without any concern for Britain that had 
previously played the role of patron of the House of Saud). To put it differently, 
“idealistic promises of the Atlantic Charter and Yalta Declaration [were due] because, in 
short, the establishment of such ideals translated into realistic contributions to the security 
of the United States”, H. Jones, Crucible of Power. A History of American Foreign 
Relations from 1897, 2nd ed., Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham, 2008, pp. 241-242. 
7
  For recent research on the Sykes-Picot Agreement, see S. Pursley, “‘Lines Drawn on an 
Empty Map’. Iraq’s Borders and the Legend of the Artificial State (Part 2)”, June 2, 2015, 
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/21780/lines-drawn-on-an-empty-
map_iraq%E2%80%99s-borders-and-the (accessed July 20, 2016). 
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resulted in further decline of French influence in the Arab world before this 
position was in turn taken over by the US. 
The period between the end of WW2 and 1956-1958 constitutes the 
transition period during which the US first removed France as a regional power 
in the Middle East and then – following on British policy failures in Egypt and 
Iraq – replaced the UK as the region’s hegemon. To begin with, the Truman 
Doctrine, announced on March 12, 1947, held that alliances should be formed 
with regional powers to contain the Soviet Union. In the early Cold War, this 
translated into the US focus on the “Northern Tier” states of Greece, Turkey, 
and Iran directly bordering the Soviet Union. In the case of the former two 
countries, the US took over the economic and political sponsorship role from 
Britain, since both countries were considered crucial to enforce the containment 
strategy. Yet the lack of any overarching US strategy for the entire Middle East 
region created new geopolitical problems. Lebanon and Syria, the two former 
French-dominated entities, had now turned into weak independent states 
without any clear-cut regional or global alignment. In this period, the regional 
Arab state system was fragmented between British clients (Egypt, Jordan, Iraq), 
a non-Arab neighboring state in which the US and UK shared interests (Iran), 
and Saudi Arabia that had been turned into a US ally by Franklin D. 
Roosevelt’s diplomacy in WW2. 
Due to the Egyptian revolution of 1952 and the subsequent rise of a new 
kind of Arab nationalism under Gamal Abdel Nasser’s leadership across the 
region, the British position deteriorated further. The growing US regional 
influence at the expense of the UK became apparent in the first year of the 
Eisenhower administration when the 1953 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
led coup in Iran, conducted in collaboration with British intelligence, against 
Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh reversed the latter’s 
nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian oil company of 1951. The coup restored the 
Shah to power and subsequently brought back western control of the Iranian oil 
sector. In this context, the former dominant role of the British was replaced by 
the US and the Shah’s Iran turned into a US client state.  
After the Iranian coup, the UK made one final effort to reorganize the 
regional security system in advancing the Baghdad Pact of April 1955. The Pact 
linked Iraq and Turkey in a mutual assistance and defense treaty that was later 
enlarged to include Iran, Pakistan, and the UK. Yet the agreement remained on 
paper only and the US did not join. In fact, Nasser had personally warned US 
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles against the idea of a treaty-based regional 
security system, arguing that “alliances with outside powers were suspect and 
unpopular with the Arab peoples” and “to try to create them was self-defeating 
[and] would only weaken the Arab governments”8. In 1956, Nasser’s decision 
                                                 
8
  R. Stephens, Nasser. A Political Biography, Penguin, London, 1970, p. 145. 
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to nationalize the British-controlled Suez Canal triggered the military attacks of 
Israel, France and the UK on Egypt. After their failure to remove Nasser from 
power, the British position was damaged beyond repair. 
In a phone call, US President Dwight D. Eisenhower reduced British 
Prime Minister Antony Eden to tears in blaming the UK for “pulling in the 
Soviet Union” by engaging in a military operation that failed in every respect, 
not least on account of further strengthening Nasser’s bargaining position and 
prestige9. According to Eisenhower, the refusal of the US to back military 
action against Nasser was due to concern that the prestige of the Soviet Union 
would otherwise rise in the eyes of the Arabs:  
 
“We could not permit the Soviet Union to seize the leadership in the struggle 
against the use of force in the Middle East and thus win the confidence of the new 
independent nations of the world. But on the other hand I  had by no means wanted 
the British and French to be branded as naked aggressors without provocation”10.  
 
One might suggest that Eisenhower’s second sentence was delivered 
tongue in cheek. 
 
 
The Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957:  
US Hegemonic Ambition in the Middle East 
  
In response to the Suez crisis and pointing to the moment of hegemonic 
transition in the Middle East from the UK to the US, the American President 
Eisenhower announced his Doctrine on 5 January 1957. The Doctrine was 
framed in terms of warnings about the Soviet Union’s firm intention to 
dominate the entire Middle East. Yet Eisenhower’s argument lacked historical 
validity in the sense that Russia (and later the Soviet Union) had held more 
modest regional aspirations in the past, namely to control the Turkish Straights 
(the Dardanelles) and to gain a stake of influence in Persia. In fact, the former 
objective had been encouraged by the western powers France and Britain before 
WW1 and had influenced the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement, while the latter had 
produced the US-backed joint British and Soviet invasion of Iran in 1941 to 
secure oil resources and transport routes for the British and Soviet war effort.  
In overstating the case that the Soviet Union was interested to take over 
the entire Middle East, the US president gained in turn an excuse to offer US 
                                                 
9
  H. Jones, Crucible of Power. A History of American Foreign Relations from 1897. 2nd ed., 
Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham, 2008, p. 326. 
10
  D.D. Eisenhower, White House Years: Waging Peace, 1956-1961, Doubleday, New York, 
1965, p. 83. 
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assistance to every state in the region, namely “to employ the armed forces of 
the United States to assist to defend the territorial integrity and the political 
independence of any nation in the area against Communist armed aggression” 
which was in turn clarified to include “aggression from any nation controlled by 
International Communism”11.  
Notably, the Eisenhower Doctrine was unilaterally announced and 
entered into force after agreement in the US Congress. Thus, it was a statement 
of intent for the entire region that differed in style and substance from the 
British tradition of making local dependent regimes sign “mutual treaties”12. In 
fact, the new Doctrine amounted to a guarantee to maintain all the existing anti-
Communist regimes in the region, in particular the various royal families that 
the British had historically worked with in Jordan, Iraq, and the Gulf. Yet it left 
open the question which of the regional states would not fall under the newly 
extended US defense guarantees. A debate arose about whether Nasser was in 
fact “controlled” by “International Communism” – and the discussion quickly 
produced US plans to block the expansion of Nasserism and of other currents of 
Arab nationalism in Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan. 
However, the final blow for the British position in the Middle East – 
after which the US no longer had to seriously negotiate with powers other than 
the Soviet Union – was the Iraqi revolution of July 14, 1958. When looking 
back, this event must be considered of nearly equal significance with the 
Egyptian revolution of 1952 and as a major turning point in Middle Eastern 
history. The revolution produced the complete destruction of the British-backed 
regime and underlined that US and UK observers had failed to act on their own 
intelligence about the extreme disconnect between the Iraqi royal regime and 
the population at large13. Directly after the revolution, the Saudi, Iranian, and 
Turkish leaderships all demanded US military intervention to topple the new 
Iraqi leadership. However, Eisenhower refused to intervene on account of the 
domestic popularity of the new Iraqi nationalist leadership and the complete 
absence of resistance on the part of the old regime14. 
Yet in order to show that his Doctrine had teeth, he agreed within 24 
hours of the Iraqi revolution a request for the dispatch of US troops to Lebanon 
                                                 
11
  D.D. Eisenhower, “Special Message to the Congress on the Situation in the Middle East”, 
January 5, 1957, capital letters in the original, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ 
ws/?pid=11007 (accessed July 20, 2016). 
12
  The unilateral declaration of “Doctrines” is in fact in line with the unwillingness of all 
post-WW2 US administrations to formally declare wars or to sign peace treaties. 
13
  B.R. King, “America’s Search for Control in Iraq in the Early Cold War, 1953-1961”, 
Doctoral Thesis, Graduate Department of History, University of Toronto, 2014, 
https://tspace.library.utoronto.ca/bitstream/1807/65675/1/King_Brandon_R_201406_PhD
_thesis.pdf (accessed July 20, 2016). 
14
  M.A. Palmer, Guardians of the Gulf. A History of America’s Expanding Role in the 
Persian Gulf, 1833-1992, The Free Press, New York, 1992, p. 79.  
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from the country’s pro-western President Camille Chamoun to protect the latter 
against local Nasserist challenges. This event, the first large-scale military 
intervention of the US with ground troops in the Middle East, established a 
pattern for future US regional conduct. Namely, the US approaches each state 
unit of the Middle East in the manner of a “cybernetic” external balancer: in 
order to influence events in country A, intervention in country B might be 
required. The entire region is always considered as a single theater, which 
differs from the earlier Sykes-Picot system, in which two external balancers, 
Britain and France, controlled two distinct regional blocs. 
The US management of the regional balance of power in the Middle 
East since the late 1950s until the present has been based on a system of 
bilateral alliances with some major regional powers, namely Israel, Saudi 
Arabia, Turkey, and Iran (until the 1979 Islamic Revolution). In the context of 
US alliance partners, Egypt is a special case and less significant: the country’s 
military is since the late 1970s principally concerned with domestic policing 
rather than the exercise of an Arab leadership role15. The US alliance partners 
are supposed to remain dependent on US patronage at all times, and any conflict 
amongst them helps to further increase US leverage. Close monitoring of the 
behavior of each aligned state’s core executive by the US goes hand in hand 
with the management of the relative power of each state unit in order to make 
them balance each other.  
Crucially, US regional alliances in the Middle East are balanced in an 
asymmetric manner: Israel has been guaranteed a large military and 
technological edge by the US over all other regional allies, especially since the 
1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars16. This US policy has been implemented by 
combining measures such as allowing Israel privileged access to the latest US 
military technology (not available to the other three powers), a willingness to 
tolerate Israeli spying/technology transfer, and by tolerating the subsequent 
domestic ability of Israel to manufacture advanced weapons systems locally or 
to engage in their reengineering17. In 2008, this approach was further formalized 
                                                 
15
  Nasser’s doctrine of the “three circles” (i.e. the effort of Egypt to exercise influence in the 
Arab, African, and Islamic world) and his reliance on military assistance from the Soviet 
Union allowed the country to gain autonomy from the western powers and to assume a 
leadership role in the Arab world. This role was abandoned after the US succeeded in 
“turning” his successor Anwar al-Sadat. Following Sadat’s unilateral decision to remove 
Egypt from the Arab line-up, by signing a peace treaty with Israel in 1978 (the Camp 
David agreement), the US re-assumed the role of sponsor of the Egyptian military which 
it continues to exercise today. Egypt has since lost its influence on the Arab peninsula. 
16
  R. v. Dehn, Jahre der Entscheidung. Die amerikanische Israel-Politik 1967 und 1973, 
Disserta Verlag, Hamburg, 2010, p. 34. 
17
  J.S. Landay, “Why is Israel’s nuclear arsenal not mentioned in Iran deal debate?”, August 
15, 2015, McClatchy DC, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/world/ 
article31470917.html (accessed July 20, 2016). 
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when the US Congress “enacted a law … requiring that arms sales allow Israel 
to maintain a ‘qualitative military edge’ in the region. All sales to the Middle 
East are evaluated based on how they will affect Israeli military superiority”18.  
At certain times, the US has sold more weapons to regional clients other 
than Israel in budgetary terms, namely the Shah of Iran appears to have received 
more supplies than Israel during some periods in the 1970s, while US arms 
deliveries to Saudi Arabia have more than doubled during the two Obama 
Presidencies, turning the Wahhabi Kingdom into the world’s fourth largest arms 
market19. However, this has never questioned Israel’s status as the only regional 
military superpower with an independent nuclear arsenal, nuclear-capable 
submarines, advanced ballistic missiles, and other weapons of mass destruction. 
In terms of the other three major US allies in the larger Middle East 
region, only one, Saudi Arabia, has been an Arab state while the other two, 
Turkey and Iran under the Shah until 1979, have acted as additional external 
balancers on Arab politics. This allowed the US to pursue different agendas 
with different clients and to keep them in a relationship of close direct 
dependency. In addition, the US could afford a degree of negligence with regard 
to some of the weaker state entities in the Middle East that were less significant 
                                                 
18
  M. Mazzetti, H. Cooper, “Sale of U.S. Arms Fuels the Wars of Arab States”, New York 
Times, April 18, 2015. 
19
  One author charges that “[d]uring the decade of the 1970s, the United States sold more 
arms to Iran than any other country” before qualifying this assertion with the statement 
that “[n]o attempt is made to analyze these arms acquisitions in terms of sophistication or 
practicality as the question is not what weapons were purchased but how much was paid”. 
See G.F. Gates, “An Analysis of the Impact of American Arms Transfers on Political 
Stability in Iran”, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, September, 1980, 
https://archive.org/stream/analysisofimpact00gate#page/n5/mode/2up (accessed July 20, 
2016), pp. 4, 20-21, emphasis added. More recent data sources such as the SIPRI data 
base on arms transfers suggest, however, that Israel has received more weapons (even in 
budgetary terms) at various points in the same decade (see 
http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers for historical information on the arms trade). 
Crucially, this highlights methodological problems in analyzing military strength in 
quantitative academic research. In fact, Israel and the US have made efforts to obscure the 
degree of military transfers: Israel receives US arms deliveries at discounted prices or for 
free which is obscured in quantitative data. Thus, quantitative data is bound to give only a 
partial picture of reality with regard to Israeli technological dominance in the military 
field. Another interesting qualification in terms of US balancing of client states in the 
Middle East is McGlinchey’s suggestion that “[t]here was never a genuine plan to 
establish a twin pillar system with Saudi Arabia and Iran [during the 1970s]. Nor was 
there a serious intention to empower other Arab states”. See S. McGlinchey, US Arms 
Policies Towards the Shah’s Iran, Routledge, Abingdon, Oxon, 2014, pp. 174-175. The 
same author holds (ibid., original emphasis) that collaboration with Iran was the 
“essence” of “the entire US approach to the Gulf” and that “Nixon established Iran as the 
pillar of US security in the Gulf, the opportunity to invest in Saudi Arabia in a 
comparative sense was put on the back burner. Saudi Arabia languished in relative 
military primitiveness through the 1970s […]”. 
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in the context of intra-Arab and Cold War conflicts. This concerned in 
particular Lebanon, in which the pro- and anti-western actors balanced each 
other out, and Jordan, where the historical links between Britain and the 
Hashemite royal family were allowed to continue to some extent because the 
US did not consider Jordan as a significant independent actor. 
However, this still left a formidable number of Arab states that did not 
belong to the US sphere of influence. These states were considered hostile from 
the point of view of subsequent US administrations as stated in the Eisenhower 
Doctrine. The list of major opponents of the US in the Middle East region 
included Egypt between 1956 and 1978, Syria between 1956 and 1961 and from 
1963 until the present, Iraq between 1958 and 2003 (and to an extent until now 
due to the alliance between the current Shia-dominated Baghdad government 
and the Islamic Republic of Iran). Most importantly, these states gained their 
autonomy from the US by turning to the Soviet Union, thereby taking 
advantage of the Cold War to pursue their own Arab nationalist agendas.  
This development began with Nasser’s shift toward the Soviet Union in 
1956 to access economic and military assistance, which was in turn motivated 
by the earlier US refusal to grant such assistance for Egypt. Nasser’s move 
produced a new kind of Arab state, namely the “garrison state” in which the 
military turned into the backbone of all other state institutions. This new kind of 
regime was dominated by a “state class” which represented the military or a 
combination of the military and Arab nationalist elites. In turn, the state class 
was able to monopolize political power due to its control of economic 
resources, namely political and/or oil rent income. Such rent income, once 
acquired, was distributed according to political rather than market criteria and 
produced systems of clientelism and patronage that proved to be highly stable 
over time20. 
Subsequently, the garrison state gained stability and some degree of 
legitimacy due to charismatic leadership in the case of Nasser and later of Hafiz 
al-Assad in Syria and, in the case of Syria and Iraq, the rapid expansion of oil 
rents since the 1970s, which further expanded the state executive’s autonomy. 
Nasser’s “Arab socialism”, therefore, combined political leadership from above 
with efforts to develop the economy in order to satisfy the material demands of 
popular constituencies. His political project, soon copied elsewhere, allowed for 
the emergence of an “authoritarian bargaining” between state executives and the 
broader population, based on the distribution of oil and political rent income to 
                                                 
20
  For the concepts of “state class” and “rentier state”, see H. Elsenhans, Abhängiger 
Kapitalismus oder bürokratische Entwicklungsgesellschaft: Versuch über den Staat 
in der Dritten Welt, 2nd. ed., Campus, Frankfurt/M., 1984. For Syria as a rentier state, 
see J.M. Dostal, “Analyzing the Domestic and International Conflict in Syria: Are there 
Lessons from Political Science?”, Syria Studies, vol. 6, no. 1, 2014, pp. 1-80, 
https://ojs.st-andrews.ac.uk/index.php/syria/article/view/822 (accessed July 20, 2016).  
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the population. This bargain could be maintained and further expanded as long 
as the distribution of rent income by the state translated into upward social 
mobility of the majority of the population. The formula generally worked in 
Syria, Iraq and other Arab states during the 1970s when oil revenue skyrocketed 
allowing for public sector expansion and rising living, health and educational 
standards. However, the model entered crisis mode whenever oil or political 
rents were in decline. On the other side of the equation, the dominance of the 
state sector, based on rent income from oil and gas, produced in practically all 
cases a permanently underdeveloped national bourgeoisie and civil society. 
Following Nasser‘s example, Syria also opted for Soviet economic and 
military assistance since 1956, while Iraq joined the fold, although in a more 
delayed fashion, after the Iraqi revolution of 1958. What made Soviet assistance 
so attractive in the eyes of the Arab leaders was that, contrary to Eisenhower’s 
claims, the Soviets had no earlier political footprint in the Arab world. 
Moreover, Soviet assistance appeared to offer increased autonomy for Arab 
nationalist regimes, who felt threatened by the US and its regional clients rather 
than by the Soviets as regional outsiders. In addition, the Soviet Union was in 
the unique position to offer Nasser and those following his example in Syria 
and Iraq advanced military hardware to turn each country’s military into a 
serious force and to balance out the military might of Israel. In particular, the 
willingness of the Soviet Union to deliver advanced jet fighters (the cutting 
edge military technology of the 1950s) allowed the Egyptian and Syrian 
military to quickly become serious regional power factors. This, in turn, 
strengthened their position in the regional state hierarchy and created a divided 
yet at the same time relatively stable system of state entities. 
The rise of two regional camps (US-backed and Soviet-backed) did also 
“lock in” regime and political economy characteristics in these countries, 
particularly authoritarian government on both sides of the divide and neo-
patrimonial patron-client relationships between state executives and the local 
population. Differences in the regime types were due to objective factors, such 
as the size of oil or political rents that were at the disposal of state executives, 
and the political background of the regime. In the case of US-backed regimes, 
the various sets of royal families, such as the one in Saudi Arabia, did perhaps 
not even qualify for the term neo-patrimonial as they failed to accommodate to 
modern mass politics. The Soviet-backed Arab nationalist regimes, on the other 
hand, engaged in the construction of political systems that appealed in rhetoric 
and sometimes in reality for approval from broader sections of the population, 
such as in the case of “authoritarian populism” in Egypt, Syria, and, to a lesser 
extent, in Iraq21. 
                                                 
21
  For the concept, see R. Hinnebusch, Syria: Revolution From Above, Routledge, London, 
2001. 
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Crucially, the management of the Cold War in the Middle East was 
based on the maintenance of the existing state system by both major external 
actors22. The regional actors were not allowed to take each other over, and 
efforts of regional actors to challenge the existing state system resulted either in 
quick failure (e.g. Syria’s intervention in the Jordanian civil war in 1970) or in 
lengthy and inconclusive wars (e.g. Nasser’s intervention in the Yemen and 
Saudi countermoves for much of the 1960s). This basic stability of state units 
did not, however, mean the absence of wars. Rather, the 1967 and 1973 Arab-
Israeli wars and the War of Attrition between Israel and Egypt between 1967 
and 1970 were conducted by the regional actors based on their external military 
alliances. In this context, the most dramatic point was the 1973 war, which one 
observer described as “the first high-tech war in the history of humanity” 
suggesting that “military attaches from all over the world were swept away by 
the efficiency of modern weapons systems and keenly took notes”23. 
The 1973 Arab-Israeli war differed from the previous ones in the sense 
that the Arab states displayed their ability to use advanced Soviet weapons 
technology in an effective way making the outcome of the war inconclusive. On 
the one hand, Arab losses were still significantly higher than the Israeli ones. 
On the other hand, the display of Arab solidarity was much more effective than 
in previous conflicts. Crucially, the Soviet Union had not encouraged the Arab 
states to engage in military action but had suggested caution. In 1973, Brezhnev 
personally counselled the Egyptian leadership against war, stating that “we are 
of the opinion that Egypt is not prepared”24. Thus, the Soviet Union behaved as 
a status quo power in the Middle East – quickly rearming its Arab clients after 
successive defeats but not allowing for Arab states to achieve full balance with 
US clients, especially Israel. In fact, the Soviet leadership assumed that a full-scale 
challenge of existing US clients, especially Israel, could trigger a global war. 
On the Israeli side, in turn, the experience of the 1973 war and the 
degree of Arab solidarity on display (Iraq entered the war on the Syrian side, 
contributing to a stabilization of the frontline in the Israel-occupied Syrian 
Golan) resulted in the long-standing Israeli effort to “deconstruct” the Arab 
states in order to avoid any repetition of the effective Arab military alliance 
building. This included the openly acknowledged Israeli long-term efforts to 
break up Syria and Iraq as unified states and to replace them with smaller units 
that would be easy to control, while also allowing for further consolidation and 
                                                 
22
  The case of the “United Arab Republic”, the unified state of Egypt and Syria between 
1958 and 1961, was the exception that proved the rule. 
23
  J.A. Elten, Karma und Karriere, Rowohlt, Hamburg, 1994, p. 64. 
24
  S. Meining, “Geheimoperation Aleppo: die geheime Beteiligung der DDR am Oktober-
Krieg 1973”, report MÜNCHEN, October 6, 2008, http://www.poolalarm.de/ 
kindersuchdienst/raf/Beteiligung_der_DDR%20_am_Yom-Kippur-Krieg_1973_Israels_ 
mit_den_arabischen_Staaten.pdf (accessed July 20, 2016). 
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expansion of the Israeli settlements in occupied Arab territories, such as the 
West Bank and the Syrian Golan25. 
 
  
Major Past Episodes of Political Destabilization in Syria 
 
Every analysis of the conflict in Syria since 2011 must be historically 
embedded. Syria has always suffered from deep internal divisions and belongs 
to a divided Arab state system that is in turn dominated by outside powers. 
Thus, for the purpose of analysis it is useful to put forward a matrix with a 
temporary axis that accounts for short-, medium-, and long-term factors, and a 
spacial axis that takes account of local Syrian, regional Arab, and global 
political factors. These factors, i.e. a matrix with nine fields, must all be 
considered to explain the violent escalation in Syria since 2011 analytically (see 
Table 1). The current paper tries to present at least a rough summary of the 
major factors in fields 1 to 6 and a brief sketch of geopolitical reasoning of the 
external powers as located in field 9. It should be stressed that all fields of the 
matrix are loosely coupled with each other. Thus, any analysis of the Syrian 
crisis that focuses only on single fields (such as field 1, which inevitably 
dominates the coverage of the Syrian war in the news media) fails to produce a 
better understanding of why Syria has turned into a transnational battlefield. 
  
Table 1 
Analytical Perspectives on the Syrian Conflict 
  
Local Syrian 
political factors 
(state level and 
below) 
Regional Arab 
and Middle 
Eastern political 
factors 
Global political 
factors 
(international 
system) 
Short-term 
(less than a decade) 1 2 3 
Medium-term 
(decade or more) 4 5 6 
Long-term (Middle Eastern 
geopolitical regime, i.e. 
1920s to 1958, 1958-1991, 
and since 1991) 
7 8 9 
                                                 
25
  See O. Yinon, “A Strategy for Israel in the Nineteen Eighties”, [orig. Hebrew in KIVUNIM 
(Directions). A Journal for Judaism and Zionism, no. 14, February 1982], available at: 
turkishforum.com.tr (accessed July 20, 2016). For an update on recent Israeli settlement 
expansions, see K. Shuttleworth, “Israel Plans to Demolish 13,000 Arab Buildings in West 
Bank, UN Says”, Guardian, September 7, 2015. The current Israeli government does not 
pretend that it is interested in “land for peace” negotiations and the last decades of the US-
steered so-called “peace process” have enabled permanent Israeli territorial expansion. 
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 In terms of earlier time periods of destabilization in Syria, one must 
highlight the following major events: 1949, 1957, 1976-82, and since 2000 
(with the advantage of hindsight, the entire period of the presidency of Bashar 
al-Assad and in particular the push against Syria’s regional position in Lebanon 
in 2005 and 2006 relate to the current crisis and must be re-evaluated in the 
regional and global context). This section now briefly discusses these four main 
episodes of past destabilization.  
To begin with, Syria gained its independence and emerged as a 
postcolonial state in 1946 under the leadership of the traditional Sunni 
landowning class. In the context of a not-yet developed system of modern 
mass and party politics, the first democratically elected Syrian president, 
Shukri al-Quwatli, relied on his personal relationship with the Saudi King in 
order to bolster his position against potential destabilization from regional 
competitors, especially the British-backed Hashemite royals in Jordan and Iraq. 
However, the Syrian president was removed in a military coup in 1949. The 
coup (the first of three in the same year) was due to a combination of global, 
regional, and local factors. In terms of the global factors, the sluggishness in 
which Quwatli answered to US demands to grant right of way for the Trans-
Arabian Pipeline (Tapline) was the main reason for local CIA involvement in 
his removal from office. Between 1947 and 1949, Tapline was constructed on 
behalf of the US-owned Arabian-American Oil Company (Aramco) as the 
largest US regional construction project in order to pump oil from Saudi Arabia 
via Syria to western European markets.  
The CIA was also involved in at least one of the two other coups in the same 
year26. In fact, practically all domestic actors in Syria looked for outside backup to 
advance their bids for power, and their behavior could only be understood in the 
larger regional and global context27. Yet when the most sophisticated of the 
strong men then emerging from the Syrian military, Adib Shishakli, who 
assumed the presidency following another coup and controlled the country until 
1954, offered the US a privileged alliance with Syria on condition of a more 
balanced approach in the Arab-Israeli conflict, this offer was rejected by 
Eisenhower. At this time, Syria appeared to offer nothing of strategic 
significance compared to the pre-existing US alliance with the Zionist state. 
In 1956, an alliance of Baathists, Communists, and Nasserists gained 
the ascendancy and assumed control of the Syrian government. The US duly 
changed their approach to Syria and considered to bring back Shishakli, who 
had in the meantime been exiled from the country. During 1956 and 1957, the 
US and the UK engaged in efforts to bring down the government in Damascus 
as part of some broader offensive to stop a Nasser-style expansion of Arab 
nationalism, which was in turn interpreted as a front for “International 
                                                 
26
  D. Little, “Mission Impossible: The CIA and the Cult of Covert Action in the Middle 
East”, Diplomatic History, vol. 28, no. 5, 2004, pp. 663-701. 
27
  P. Seale, The Struggle for Syria. A Study of Post-War Arab Politics, 1945-1958, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1965. 
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Communism” in line with the rhetoric of the Eisenhower Doctrine. The joint 
intelligence operations of the US and the UK proceeded under different code 
names – Operation Straggle, Operation Wappen, and Preferred Plan, to name 
but a few – and included at various times France, Saudi Arabia, and other Arab 
client regimes in efforts to link up with Syrian rightist forces willing to lead a 
coup to remove the leftist government from office28. In this context, the British 
preferred their Hashemite allies in Iraq and/or Jordan to take over Syrian 
politics, while the Americans wanted to coordinate with Syrian tribes and 
minority communities in a “Free Syria Committee” to engineer a domestic 
uprising in line with the CIA’s earlier covert action that had forced out Prime 
Minister Mossadegh of Iran in 195329. 
The US and the UK shared a pragmatic outlook in the sense that plans 
for a takeover of Syrian politics were made and discarded quickly – a long-term 
strategy was noticeably absent. Ultimately, the various plots triggered the 
“Syrian crisis” of August-October 1957, which started due to Turkish 
preparations to invade Syria militarily to bring down the Syrian government. 
However, this move resulted in the quick breakdown of the anti-Syrian coalition 
since the pro-western Arab clients, led by Saudi Arabia, were opposed to a 
Turkish invasion of an Arab country. Following Soviet counter-threats against 
Turkey, a diplomatic effort on the part of the US and the Soviet Union occurred 
which succeeded in negotiating a closure of the crisis by withdrawing the 
mutual threats. In summary, the Syrian crisis of 1957 underlined that a balance 
of power had emerged in the Middle East that was now policed by the two 
superpowers and that the domestic stability of each Arab state unit depended on 
security guarantees from outside. 
The Syrian crisis of 1976-1982, the first extensive domestic 
destabilization of Syria before the 2011 conflict, was triggered by the uprising 
of a faction of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood against the Baath regime of 
Syria’s President Hafiz al-Assad. The uprising was due to a combination of 
domestic disenchantment of the Brotherhood with the regime and criticism of 
Syria’s intervention in Lebanon, which was seen as biased in favor of non-
Muslim groups. The uprising consisted of a campaign of urban terrorism against 
representatives of the Syrian state targeting in particular members of the 
Alawite community, a religious minority to which the Assad family belongs. A 
first peak of sectarian violence was reached on 16 June 1979, when a 
commando aligned with the Brotherhood killed a large number of unarmed 
Alawite cadets at the Aleppo Artillery School. Between 1979 and 1982, the 
violence further escalated for geopolitical reasons. The Brotherhood was 
                                                 
28
  A. Rathmell, Secret War in the Middle East: The Covert Struggle for Syria, 1949-1961, 
I.B. Tauris, London, 1995, chapter 5. 
29
  M. Jones, “The ‘Preferred Plan’: The Anglo-American Working Group Report on Covert 
Action in Syria, 1957”, Intelligence and National Security, vol. 19, no. 3, 2004, pp. 401-415. 
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considered a valuable proxy in efforts to weaken Syria’s regional position by 
neighboring countries and in particular from Saddam Hussein’s Iraq30. 
When Saddam decided to go to war against neighboring Iran in 1980, 
the Brotherhood appeared as a useful counterweight against the emerging Syria-
Iran defense alliance. Additional support for the Brotherhood came from Jordan, 
Turkey, and anti-Syrian factions in Lebanon. Ultimately, the Brotherhood campaign 
failed due to its limited domestic support base when the Syrian military crushed 
the organization’s uprising in the city of Hama in 1982. Most western accounts 
focus almost exclusively on this event (the “Hama massacre”), but fail to take 
account of the Brotherhood’s terrorist activities beforehand. 
Moving on to the period of 2000-2011, the transition of the Syrian 
presidency after Hafiz al-Assad’s death in office to his third son, Bashar al-
Assad, could be understood as an effort of the part of the Syrian regime to avoid 
internal conflicts. Looking back at the transition with the advantage of 
hindsight, it appears that there were domestically-oriented factions (the 
majority), while there were also factions (or at least individual high-ranking 
Syrian officials) that had built up connections with conservative Arab states, 
such as Saudi Arabia, and hoped to use their connections to shift the regime in 
their favor. Yet the transition to Bashar proceeded smoothly and he quickly 
became the main representative of the regime, while many older Baathists 
retired and generational renewal took place. However, the resignation of long-
standing Vice President of Syria Abdul Halim Khaddam, a prominent Sunni and 
long-term associate of Hafiz, in mid-2005, followed by his sudden departure to 
Paris at the end of the same year to link up with the Muslim Brotherhood in 
exile to found a “National Salvation Front” underlined that some degree of 
infighting must have occurred. 
The two major challenges in the first period of Bashar’s time in office 
were external, however. First, the US had during the Bill Clinton presidency 
officially committed to a policy of regime change in neighboring Iraq (the so-
called “Iraq Liberation Act” of 1998). Second, this policy – perhaps worth to be 
called a “Doctrine” and underlining the continuity between Clinton and Bush 
administrations – followed up on earlier UN-led economic sanctions against 
Iraq that had according to some observers resulted in the dead of around a 
million Iraqi citizens during the 1990s due to the sanctions-imposed breakdown 
                                                 
30
  The declassified Defense Intelligence Agency report “Syria: Muslim Brotherhood 
Pressure Intensifies”, 1982, May, https://www.syria360.files.wordpress.com/2013/11/dia-
syria-muslimbrotherhoodpressureintensifies-2.pdf (accessed September 1, 2015) refers to 
the Brotherhood as a “Sunni Muslim Islamic fundamentalist organization” and suggests 
further that most Syrians “would probably admit that the current level of tension in Syria 
is a result of Brotherhood actions” (p. iii, p. 8). It is important to stress that US and UK 
policymakers have always been interested in Islamist groups, such as the Brotherhood, for 
their potential as proxies against secular Arab nationalism. 
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of the Iraqi economy, health care, and education systems31. Ultimately, the US 
invasion of Iraq in 2003 took out Saddam’s Sunni-led regime. The destruction 
of the Iraqi Baath regime subsequently produced a Shia-dominated Iraqi 
government in Baghdad with close relations to neighboring Iran, i.e. the 
remaining most powerful regional US opponent. Thus, US military action 
allowed, for the first time in the postcolonial histories of Syria, Iraq, and Iran, 
the emergence of a triple-alliance between the three states by adding Iraq to the 
pre-existing Syria-Iran defense alliance. Because of this unintended outcome, 
US state executives in the Bush, Jr. and Obama administrations advocated for 
another round of rebalancing – this time by shifting to coalition building with 
Sunni forces in Iraq and other Arab countries to isolate the “triple alliance” of 
Syria, Iraq, and Iran32.  
From today’s point of view, regime change in Iraq was part of a larger 
US agenda, started under Clinton and continued by the so-called “neocons” that 
came to dominate the Bush, Jr. foreign policy agenda, to replace governments in 
seven countries, namely Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and 
Iran33. In the build-up to the US occupation of Iraq, Bashar followed a mixed 
strategy. On the one hand, some collaboration in the US-declared war on 
terrorism was offered, while the alliances with Iran and the Hezbollah 
movement in Lebanon, rightly seen as the backbone of Syria’s regional 
position, were also entrenched.  
Following the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik 
Hariri, a politician strongly linked with France and Saudi Arabia, in February 
2005, Syria was blamed in the western media and by pro-western factions in 
Lebanon, although no evidence has ever since been presented to solve the case. 
The Hariri assassination acted as a catalyst to increase the pressure on Syria to 
withdraw its troops from Lebanon, where they had been stationed since the end 
of the Lebanese civil war in 1990. The decision of Bashar to withdraw the 
                                                 
31
  M. Lüders, Wer den Wind sät. Was westliche Politik im Orient anrichtet, C.H. Beck, 
Munich, 2015, p. 44.  
32
  This paper uses the terms “Sunni” and “Shia” to explain geopolitical rather than religious 
alignments. Thus, state executives might chose to appeal to religious identities in order to 
mobilize for political purposes. At the same time, they will often accept that geopolitical 
concerns overrule other potentially significant cleavages, such as religion or ideology. For 
example, the close links between Armenia and the Islamic Republic of Iran are due to 
geopolitical reasons overruling other cleavages. 
33
  Differences between the so-called “neocons” and the so-called “liberal interventionists” 
are usually over style rather than substance of US foreign policymaking. Thus, the Bush I, 
Clinton, Bush II, and Obama years were all characterized by the embeddedness of the 
“neocons”, moving between positions in government, corporations, and think tanks. They 
all wish for Hillary Clinton to become the next US president. For “neocons” during the 
Bush Jr. years, see in particular W.P. Lang, “Drinking the Kool-Aid”, Middle East Policy, 
vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 39-60, and for US efforts at “regime change” in the Middle East and the 
Arab world, see in particular W. Clark, “Speech at the Commonwealth Club of 
California”, San Francisco, October 3, 2007, https://www.youtube.com/watch? 
v=r8FhZnFZ6TY (accessed July 20, 2016). 
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Syrian troops, in response to the UN Security Council Resolution 1559, in April 
2005 weakened the country’s regional position to a large extent. Removing 
troops under external pressure, which Russia did not oppose at the time, might 
have been considered a sign of weakness by observers keen to consider Syrian 
regime change scenarios.  
Directly following on the Syrian withdrawal, the 34-day war between 
Israel and Hezbollah took place in the south of Lebanon during July and August 
of 2006. The war was inconclusive, resulted in Israeli withdrawal after large-
scale devastation of the Shia regions of Lebanon, and strengthened the position 
of Hezbollah in the context of Lebanese politics. From today’s point of view, 
the period after the end of the 34-day war might be considered the high point of 
Bashar’s presidency, as it appeared that the Syrian influence in Lebanon did not, 
ultimately, depend on troops, but could also be exercised in a more indirect manner. 
Next, there was the interlude of the European Union’s (EU) offering to 
Syria of a so-called “Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Agreement”. This 
Agreement would have opened the Syrian market for EU products and 
investments and was perhaps expected to trigger a major shift in Syria’s 
domestic political economy away from a state-led system toward a “social 
market economy” (a term that was popular with some Syrian government 
officials for some time). During the negotiations, Bashar was invited to Paris by 
then French President Nicolas Sarkozy in 2008, which could be considered the 
high point of external recognition of the Syrian regime. However, the entire EU 
policies in the region had little impact and were poorly though through. 
Ultimately, the Syrian regime could not realistically be expected to open its 
market for EU products without undermining its domestic economic 
structures34. This interlude, just like the short flourishing of friendly relations 
between the western powers and Libya around the same time, served as little 
more than a distraction.  
                                                 
34
  J.M. Dostal, “The European Union and Economic Reform in Syria”, in J.M. Dostal, 
A. Zorob, Syria and the Euro-Mediterranean Relationship, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, Col., 
2008, pp. 18-20. Another interesting feature of the period between 2005 and 2011 was the 
insistence of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that Syria would soon run out of oil 
and gas deposits. The IMF suggested in this context that the Syrian government should 
urgently cut domestic subsidies and levels of state employment. With the advantage of 
hindsight, it appears that the IMF pushed this line at a moment in time when it had 
already become obvious to informed observers that Syria was in fact likely to have access 
to significant new gas fields on the Mediterranean coastline. These new assets might have 
influenced deliberation amongst western strategists on how to deal with Syria and made 
efforts to remove the Assad government from power more attractive. See N. Ahmed, 
“Western Firms Primed to Cash in on Syria’s Oil and Gas ‘Frontier”’, December 1, 2015, 
https://medium.com/insurge-intelligence/western-firms-plan-to-cash-in-on-syria-s-oil-
and-gas-frontier-6c5fa4a72a92#.etjvo1uod (accessed July 20, 2016). One must keep in 
mind that the oil and gas fields in the Mediterranean might attract claims from all states in 
the proximity, notably Cyprus, Turkey, Lebanon, Israel – as well as Syria. 
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Once the Syrian domestic conflict began in March 2011, the regime 
change discourse reappeared in the context of US and EU announcements. 
These took place in the context of inappropriate comparisons with the situation 
in other Arab countries. The starting point was the long-standing commitment 
of the US to regime change in Syria, sometimes acknowledged and at other 
times covered, during the Bush, Jr. administration, which started out with the 
“Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act” announced in 
December 2003.  
In the period directly after the US invasion of Iraq, there was fear in 
Damascus that Syria would be next on the agenda. This fear resided when the 
US started to visibly fail to gain the ascendancy in Iraq in terms of enforcing 
direct political control and had to fall back on Shia political forces in the 
country that were close to Syria’s main ally Iran. In fact, US pressure helped the 
regime to organize strong pro-Bashar and pro-Syrian nationalism rallies across 
the country that showed that many Syrians were keen to avoid domestic conflict 
by backing the existing state. The general feeling was that Syria was surrounded 
by danger zones, especially in Lebanon and Iraq, and that everything should be 
done to avoid a spillover of conflict into Syria. The visible presence of large 
numbers of Iraqi refugees all over Syria also added to the feeling of immediate 
danger that was expressed by Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah in a 2007 
interview, when he suggested that “chaos and internal battles like in Iraq” could 
also happen in Syria35. 
In 2007, the US media acknowledged that the Bush, Jr. administration 
had launched a campaign against the Syrian regime, which was apparently run 
by Elliot Abrahams, described as “a conservative White House aide in charge of 
pushing Bush’s global democracy agenda”36. In July 2008, the Syrian leadership 
took the initiative to have the Syrian ambassador in the US call for new 
negotiations with Israel over the issue of the occupied Syrian Golan and the 
other conflicts. While details are still difficult to confirm, it should be stressed 
that Syria had engaged with Israel concerning a settlement of the conflicts 
between the two countries for much of the 1990s and during the early 2000s. 
Ultimately, Israel always refused to make concessions with regard to the 
substantial issues. Three days after the 2008 initiative, an Israeli commando 
                                                 
35
  Quoted in S.M. Hersh, “The Redirection. Is the Administration’s New Policy Benefitting 
our Enemies in the War on Terrorism?”, The New Yorker, March 5, 2007. This article 
remains the most significant brief account of the US strategic rebalancing from “Shia” to 
“Sunni” in the period following the 2003 Iraq invasion. 
36
  W.P. Strobel, “U.S. steps up campaign against Syrian government”, McClatchy Newspapers, 
http://www.idahostatesman.com/2007/03/30/1421258_us-steps-up-campaign-against-
syrian.html?rh=1 (accessed September 1, 2015). See also “Roebuck” [i.e. William V. 
Roebuck, US Political Councilor at the US Embassy in Damascus between 2004 and 2007], 
“Influencing the SARG [i.e. Syrian Arab Republic Government] at the End of 2006”, 
December 13, 2006, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06DAMASCUS5399_a.html 
(accessed July 20, 2016). The memorandum outlines scenarios on how to destabilize 
Syria. 
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entered Syria and assassinated a Syrian general, which was described in a US 
National Security Agency report as the “first known instance of Israel targeting 
a legitimate government official”37. 
Under the Obama administration, the funding of Syrian opposition 
groups continued. There was also a noticeable, although poorly documented, 
steady rise in armed clashes between Islamist groups and the Syrian army and 
security forces in the run-up to March 2011, when the uprising in the southern 
Syrian city of Daraa started the current conflict. Nevertheless, the most crucial 
geopolitical reason for the shift in US strategy on Syria, from covert action to 
acknowledged efforts at regime change, must be found in the larger regional 
context. In particular, Obama’s decision to withdraw most US troops from Iraq 
in 2011 made the US lose its direct military veto position against efforts to 
consolidate the triple alliance of Syria, Iraq, and Iran. This was certainly the 
most unfortunate geopolitical outcome of the Iraqi invasion from the US point 
of view. On the other hand, regaining direct military access to Iraq – US troops 
returned in mid-2014 to “fight Islamic State” – and removing the Syrian 
government from office constituted another US effort to realize geopolitical 
gains from the post-2003 Iraqi occupation.  
One of the political expressions of a potential consolidation of the triple 
alliance was the refusal of Bashar, in 2010, to agree to the construction of the 
“Qatar-Turkey Pipeline” across Syrian territory. He also refused to allow an 
extension of the already existing “Arab Gas Pipeline” across Syria toward 
Turkey. The former project, jointly pushed by Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, 
concerned plans to construct a Qatari and Saudi oil and gas pipeline across 
Syria to reach Turkey and the EU markets38. The latter project concerned an 
extension of an existing gas pipeline that currently connects Egypt and Jordan 
with Syria and Lebanon, and, crucially in geopolitical terms, could have been 
extended from its current end point in the Syrian city of Homs toward Turkey39. 
The two projects would have served the interests of the pro-US conservative 
Arab states. Conversely, they would weaken Russia’s position in the European 
energy market in the medium and long term and negatively affect the future 
prospects of Iran to sell energy resources internationally. 
Crucially, the triple alliance states advanced an alternative project, the 
so-called Friendship pipeline (termed the “Islamic Pipeline” in western 
accounts), that would connect Syria, Iraq, and Iran with the Mediterranean and 
the Persian Gulf. This plan excludes the Sunni states and could also potentially 
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  M. Cole, “Israeli Special Forces Assassinated Senior Syrian Government Official”, 
https://theintercept.com/2015/07/15/israeli-special-forces-assassinated-senior-syrian-
official/ (accessed July 20, 2016).  
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  C. Lin, “Syrian Buffer Zone – Turkey-Qatar Pipeline”, ISPSW Strategy Series: Focus on 
Defense and International Security, No. 367, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/ 
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  J. Robinson, “Why Syria? An Examination of The Iran-Iraq-Syria Pipeline”, August 27, 
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serve as part of a larger “Silk Road” strategy of linking with China and other 
expanding oil and gas consuming markets in Asia. In this context, a meeting 
between the then Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Bashar in 
February 2010, underlining the close geopolitical alignment between both 
countries, must have been considered provocative by US policymakers40.  
The subsequent rejection of Bashar to do business with Turkey, Saudi 
Arabia, and Qatar is the most crucial regional factor to explain external support for 
the Syrian insurgency by the regional opponents of Syria. In addition, the US 
“withdrawal” from Iraq, always incomplete and by now already reversed to a large 
extent, is the most crucial reason for US interest at regional rebalancing by 
removing the Syrian president from power. This also means to send new US troops 
into the Arab world, including Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. In fact, such military 
escalation is openly acknowledged in the US media as an ongoing concern and 
shows that Obama’s promises about withdrawing from Iraq have been broken41. 
 
 
The Political Nature of the Syrian Uprising 
at the Domestic Level 
 
It is certainly true that geopolitical analysis delivers only a partial 
picture of reality. However, the events of the so-called “Arab spring” have 
underlined that accounts stressing domestic drivers of uprisings in Arab states 
and North Africa were equally unable to provide convincing analysis. Although 
this paper focuses on geopolitical factors, the current section attempts a brief 
and “neutral” description of the domestic origins of the Syrian uprising.  
To begin with, propaganda works generally by selecting “facts” that 
become isolated from the larger context to which these “facts” belong. Such 
“facts” are used to construct simple narratives following the logic of good 
                                                 
40
  I. Black, “Iran and Syria Put On a Show of Unity in Alliance Clinton Finds ‘Troubling’”, 
Guardian, February 25, 2010. 
41
  In this context, the current Emirati ambassador to the US, Yousef al-Otaiba, is quoted 
stating that “Americans and the Emiratis were in agreement about the need for 
intervention in Yemen – and more specifically about having a military presence in Aden”, 
see M. Mazzetti, E. Schmitt, “Quiet Support for Saudis Entangles U.S. in Yemen”, New 
York Times, March 13, 2016. At the moment of finishing this paper in July 2016, the 
Obama administration has moved new troops to practically all conflict spots in the Middle 
East region, including Yemen, to allow maximum freedom of choice for the successor 
administration to escalate existing commitments. In the words of one US observer: 
“Starting wars under murky circumstances and then watching limited commitments 
expand exponentially is by now so ingrained in America’s global strategy that it’s barely 
noticed”, see P. Van Buren, “5 lessons American Has Failed to Learn from the Iraq War”, 
Salon, May 17, 2016, http://www.salon.com/2016/05/17/5_ways_iraq_and_syria_ 
continue_to_haunt_america_partner/, originally published at tomdispatch.com (accessed 
July 20, 2016). 
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versus evil in which critical scrutiny is considered unnecessary in order to 
establish the “essence” of events. The major element of propaganda is patient 
repetition of apparent facts: they are turned over time into established facts by 
the very process of repetition. An example is the claim that the Syrian army has 
used chemical weapons against domestic opponents, which is generally treated 
as an uncontested fact by the western media. Thus, discursive repetition 
produces the exclusion of counterfactual evidence and reality, as filtered by 
media discourse, produces an “essence” of events that becomes accepted as the 
foundation for further discourse. 
 In the context of the Syrian uprising, the following claims were turned 
into facts by the exclusion of counterfactual evidence: (1) the Arab Spring is a 
pro-democracy movement across the Middle East; (2) the Syrian opposition is 
part of the pro-democracy movement; (3) the Syrian regime has lost the support 
of “the people” and “the people want the fall of the regime”; (4) the Syrian 
regime is based exclusively on repression and cannot be reformed domestically; 
(5) support for the opposition will break the regime, which is isolated from the 
people, and will issue in a more democratic state in Syria. Very briefly, each of 
these “facts” has never been more than a claim, and counterfactual evidence has 
been written out of the western media discourse. To begin with, most Arab 
Spring movements were ad-hoc coalitions of Islamist, leftist and liberal 
democratic forces, challenging various authoritarian regimes that were in turn 
very different in terms of their political support base and foreign backing. In all 
states other than Tunisia, the movements were either quickly repressed 
(Bahrain), produced a renewal of military rule (Egypt), or resulted in failed 
statehood (post-Gaddafi Libya).  
 In the Syrian context, the five “facts” indicated above need to be 
clarified as follows: (1) the profile of the protest movements in the streets of 
Syria was from the beginning mostly Islamist and the slogan “No to Iran, no to 
Hezbollah, we want a leader who fears god” [i.e. a Sunni Islamist figure, rather 
than Bashar] expressed the movement’s intention to create an Islamist state that 
would exclude Syria’s minorities. The support for the protests in the streets, 
which included almost from the beginning armed attacks on the Syrian state, 
was strongly concentrated in rural areas and in parts of Syria in which local 
Sunnis had tribal links with neighboring conservative Arab countries opposing 
the Syrian leadership. At no point did the majority (or even a large share) of the 
Syrian Sunnis join the opposition, nor did the movement enjoy support from 
any of Syria’s religious and ethnic minorities with the exception of a tiny 
minority; (2) the Islamist nature of the opposition movement meant that leftist 
and liberal democratic components were only present at the margins and they 
failed to play any significant role. Some of the leftist and liberal groups 
supported the Syrian government, either as part of the “official opposition” 
engaging in dialogue with the regime or in joining the government directly, 
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while other elements could never break out from their own political isolation42; 
(3) the Syrian regime has engaged in impressive mobilizations across the 
country, notably the pro-government street rallies of the years 2011 and 2012 
that were the largest political rallies in the history of the country, in the 2012 
constitutional referendum and parliamentary elections, and in the 2014 
presidential and 2016 parliamentary elections. On each of these occasions, the 
degree of political mobilization for the government was very high, especially 
when compared with developments in other Arab countries, such as the 2014 
Egyptian presidential elections, in which rates of participation were very low43. 
In comparison with pro-government rallies, opposition rallies were much 
smaller and also small in comparison with the “Arab Spring” mobilizations in 
other countries. This observation was either explained away by claiming that 
government repression was to blame (even at times, when the Syrian state had 
withdrawn from opposition territories, such as in sectors of the city of Homs at 
various points), or by claiming high numbers of participants in fictitious 
opposition rallies; (4) domestically-driven democratic reforms were never 
explored. Contrary to western claims that the regime offered “too little too late”, 
one needs to stress that reform projects and efforts to engage in dialogue were 
taking place directly after the uprising started. For example, the “Consultative 
Meeting for National Dialogue” in Syria issued a resolution that supported 
“Dialogue [as] the only way leading the country to ending the crisis”, and the 
Syrian Vice-President Farouk al-Shara said on this occasion that he hoped to 
see the “transformation of Syria into a pluralistic, democratic state where its 
citizens are equal and participate in the formation of their homeland’s future”44. 
However, there was never any willingness on the part of the Islamist groups to 
engage in dialogue with the state, which in turn weakened those parts of the 
regime that genuinely intended to offer it; (5) finally, western and conservative 
Arab state’s financing of the insurgency amounted to support for Islamist 
groups rather than support for democracy. 
                                                 
42
  In particular, the group “Building the Syrian State” appears to represent a liberal-
democratic program. It has neither followed the regime nor has it joined the insurgency. 
Yet it never received any attention from those claiming to advance “democratization” in 
the Middle East, nor has it gained recognition in western media discourse. In short, the 
failure of the group to influence events shows the weakness of liberal democratic forces in 
Syria.  
43
  The pro-government bloc in Syria is much larger than the highly factionalized armed 
insurgency with its large non-Syrian component or any of the political opposition groups. 
It might be argued that many Syrians do no longer support any political current, since 
people must spend all their energy in order to survive poverty and devastation issued in by 
the war. Certainly, the long-term political future of Syria will be shaped by the Syrian 
people’s judgement about who is to be blamed for the country’s destruction. 
44
 Syrian Arab News Agency, “Dialogue Only Way to Ending Crisis, Comprehensive 
National Dialogue Conference”, July 12, 2011. 
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 To sum up, the Syrian conflict would have ended a long time ago with 
the reassertion of the Syrian government’s authority, based on its superior 
domestic support base, if the geopolitical factors would not have motivated the 
US and the regional Sunni powers to deliver arms and offer political support for 
the Islamist groups to turn the domestic Syrian conflict into a full-scale 
transnational war with ongoing local, regional, and global repercussions. 
 
 
Transnational War in Syria: 
Local, Regional, and Global Factors 
 
This section provides a short analysis of the major periods of the Syrian 
conflict, which started in mid-March 2011 with protests against the Syrian 
government in some cities, especially the Southern Syrian city of Daraa, and 
has subsequently escalated into a large-scale and sustained transnational war. 
This conflict has been described at various times as a civil war, international 
civil war, proxy war, and as Syria’s global war. The number of parties in the 
armed conflict has increased over time, while the political meaning of the 
conflict has become increasingly contested. In particular, the initial division 
between pro- and anti-government forces has been replaced by a number of 
parallel wars that point far beyond Syria’s territory.  
At present, one might identify wars between the Syrian government and 
Islamist insurgents; wars between different groups of Islamist insurgents; wars 
between Islamist insurgents and the so-called “Islamic State” (IS) terrorist 
organization; wars between the Syrian government and IS; air strikes of the US 
against IS in Iraq and Syria that appear to have had no impact on the latter, 
while more recent Russian air strikes, since September 2015, appear to have had 
a significant impact; air strikes of Turkey on Kurds in Syria and Iraq; clashes 
between Kurdish militias (YPG) and the IS terrorist group as well as Turkish-
supported militias, some of this fighting with the direct participation of US 
soldiers, possibly on more than one side, which in turn is based on recent US 
efforts to rebrand the Kurdish militias as “Syrian Democratic Forces” (SDF), a 
move that is in turn opposed by Erdogan’s Turkish government; wars between 
various other ethnic and sectarian militias; air strikes of Israel on Syrian 
government targets; and Israeli medical and logistical assistance to Islamist 
insurgents in the Syrian Golan, to name but a few45. In addition, one must also 
stress the “hybrid” nature of the conflict, in which military escalation proceeds 
in parallel with propaganda warfare, economic sanctions, and permanent 
rebalancing of the groups fighting on the ground by external powers, especially 
                                                 
45
  R. Ahren, “Israel Acknowledges it is Helping Syrian Rebel Fighters”, The Times of Israel, 
June 29, 2015. 
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Russia, Hezbollah and Iran on the side of the Syrian government, and the US 
and the Sunni conservative Arab states on the side of the insurgents. 
The rebalancing is in turn balanced, i.e. the outside powers know that 
they essentially maintain the ability of the different groups to sustain the 
fighting on the ground, rather than to allow any of the parties to “win”. In fact, 
the high number of actors in Syria’s transnational war makes it logically 
difficult to conceive any clear-cut outcome of the conflict. The scenario of a 
failed state is therefore the default option, which will in turn destabilize 
neighboring countries, as already demonstrated in the case of Libya and Iraq. In 
addition, the Syrian refugee crisis inflicts high costs on neighboring countries 
and the EU countries, both economically and in terms of undermining security 
efforts to stop the cross-border proliferation of Islamist groups. Notably, the 
US, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar remain largely unaffected by the Syrian 
refugee crisis as they have refused to open their borders46. In sum, it is currently 
impossible to predict if the conflict will end soon or will continue for another 
decade or more. This section provides a brief periodization of the conflict and 
explains how local, regional, and international factors have interacted in each period. 
 The following ten-stage periodization is suggested: (1) initial protests 
and slow-scale militarization (March 2011-July 2011); (2) the NATO bombing 
campaign in Libya produces the destruction of the Gaddafi regime and 
subsequent Libyan state failure. The result is large-scale proliferation of arms 
from Libyan depots to Islamist groups and especially the Syrian insurgents, 
under the guidance of western and Arab intelligence agencies and delivered via 
Turkey. In turn, a steady escalation toward a full-scale war-like situation in 
many areas of Syria follows due to the increased military strength of the 
Islamist extremists. Finally, the assassination of the Syrian Defense and Deputy 
Defense Ministers and of other high-ranking Syrian government officials in an 
explosion in Damascus on 18 July is expected to issue in the “Syrian 
revolution” but fails to have the expected impact since the Syrian state 
continues to function (August 2011-July 2012); (3) further escalation of fighting 
across the country. This produces the growth of pro-government militias to 
balance out the increased strength of the Islamists and ends with the recapture 
of the strategic city of Qusayr by the Syrian army and Hezbollah (August 2012-
June 2013); (4) further escalation and proliferation of Islamist groups. By now, 
the US military supplies for the insurgents are openly acknowledged for the first 
time (July 2013-December 2013); (5) IS enters the Syrian war (January) and the 
“Nusra Front” (i.e. the Syrian branch of Al Qaeda) engages in sectarian attacks 
on the Syrian-Armenian town of Kessab from bases in Turkey (March); the 
                                                 
46
  The Gulf sheikdoms and Saudi Arabia claim, against their own better knowledge, that 
they house Syrian refugees on their territory. In fact, they count pre-crisis Syrian migrant 
workers employed in construction and services as “refugees” in order to obscure their 
political role in the Syrian crisis. 
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Syrian army recaptures Kessab and Syrian multi-candidate presidential 
elections take place (June) (January-June 2014); (6) US air strikes on IS in Syria 
and Iraq start since September 2014; they have little or no impact but allow the 
US to bring back ground troops into Iraq. Some further Syrian army advances 
occur until app. February 2015 (July 2014-February 2015); (7) increased 
coordination of Islamist insurgency groups financed and supplied by Qatar, 
Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, e.g. “Southern Front” (supplied from Jordanian 
territory), “Nusra Front” and “Army of Conquest” (supplied from Turkish 
territory), pointing to the tactical realignment of different Islamist currents on 
the ground and resulting in advances against the Syrian army (March 2015-
September 2015); (8) the Russian military mission enters Syria based on an 
invitation by the Syrian government and targets IS and other Islamist groups 
with heavy airstrikes that restore momentum for the Syrian army (September 
2015-March 2016); (9) the declaration of a Syrian ceasefire by the International 
Syria Support Group (ISSG), co-chaired by Russia and the US, occurs in late 
February, which is followed by the announcement of the partial withdrawal of 
the Russian air force detachment from Syria in mid-March; this produces a 
decline in fighting but is used by the sponsors of the Islamist groups to resupply 
them. These resupply includes anti-aircraft rockets in an effort to strengthen 
their capabilities against the Syrian army and Russian air force; (10) the 
announcement of “‘concrete steps’ to ensure a long-term ceasefire in Syria” 
between Russia and the US is issued during a meeting between the foreign ministers 
Sergey Lavrov and John Kerry in Moscow on July 16 (March to July 2016)47. 
 Looking at the periodization – that is only indicative, highlighting some 
of the major events – one should stress that the conflict would have already 
ended a long time ago with a “victory” of the Syrian government in the absence 
of foreign intervention. The Syrian government is the only actor with a 
conventional army, air force, superior local intelligence, and deep roots in state 
and society. However, the western mainstream media have always claimed that 
the Assad regime was just about to break down, thereby inviting further efforts 
to tip the balance by military means and by linking up with Islamist insurgents. 
In this context, the western media were in turn influenced by efforts and large-
scale spending on the part of the conservative Sunni states engaging in 
psychological warfare on Syria. It is therefore significant to stress that external 
                                                 
47
  “US, Russia Agree on Concrete Steps on Long-term Ceasefire in Syria – Lavrov”, July 
16, 2016, https://www.rt.com/news/351626-lavrov-kerry-syria-ceasefire/ (accessed July 
20, 2016). The “agreement” comes at a moment in time when the Syrian army is 
advancing against the insurgents. However, all previous Syrian army advances have been 
rebalanced by new supplies of advanced weapons to the insurgents. It should be noted that 
the supply of anti-aircraft rockets to the insurgents is a major threat to international 
civilian aviation. It is too early to judge if the Moscow agreement between Russia and the 
US is going to influence the behavior of the next US administration. 
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balancing in different fields (not just with regard to the military situation) 
constitutes the major mechanism to regulate the Syrian war and to keep it going. 
Any successful peace talks would therefore demand all three conflict levels 
(local, regional, and global) to be jointly addressed. At present, this continues to 
be unlikely, although progress toward a “neither war nor peace” scenario might 
de-escalate the situation if Russia and the US were ready to collaborate. There 
are, however, reasons to assume that such collaboration would focus only on 
short-term interests. 
 The remainder of this section briefly highlights the main developments 
in each of the ten periods outlined above, looking in turn at local, regional, and 
global factors. In the first period (March-July 2011), the anti-government rallies 
were claimed to amount to a “peaceful revolution” in Syria. At the local level, 
anti-government mobilization was said to be met on a large scale with 
government repression. This description of the situation was quickly accepted in 
the western media discourse and constitutes the greatest – and only ever – 
political success of the opposition groups. This ignored the fact that the 
opposition rallies entailed nearly from the very beginning violence against 
representatives of the Syrian state and large-scale casualties amongst the police 
force, the military and pro-government civilians. For example, on March 20, 
2011 (three days after the first anti-government rallies in Daraa), “seven police 
officers were killed, and the Baath Party Headquarters and courthouse [in the 
city of Daraa] were torched”48. In the western media, “peaceful opposition 
                                                 
48
  It is still difficult to reconstruct the actual events in Daraa in late March 2011. An early 
Israeli media source, G. Kahn, “Syria: Seven Police Killed, Buildings Torched in 
Protests”, March 21, 2011, http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/ 
143026#.Ve09qZsVhFp (accessed July 20, 2016), might be interpreted as an effort to 
make the Syrian authorities look weak. This is also suggested by a source from a different 
section of the media spectrum, S. Narwani, “Syria: The Hidden Massacre”, Russia Today, 
https://www.rt.com/op-edge/157412-syria-hidden-massacre-2011/ (accessed June 20, 
2016), which quotes an anonymous Daraa citizen stating that “[a]t that time, the [Syrian] 
government did not want to show they are weak and the opposition did not want to show 
they are armed”. What is uncontested in different sources is that the Daraa Baath Party 
headquarters was burned down 72 hours after the first anti-government rallies took place 
and that there were casualties on both sides. A more recent source, J. Marshall, “Hidden 
Origins of Syria’s Civil War”, Consortiumnews.com, July 20, 2015, 
https://consortiumnews.com/2015/07/20/hidden-origins-of-syrias-civil-war/ (accessed 
July 20, 2016), provides links to a number of other relevant sources about the early 
conflict. Some of these links, such as the one relating to Al Jazeera, the voice of the anti-
Syrian government Qatari royal family, and notorious for its disinformation on Syria, 
should in turn be read critically. Moreover, the online comment section of Marshall’s 
article provides some useful clarifications on the original research. What aspires from any 
serious and critical evaluation of the 2011 Daraa events is that they cannot be adequately 
summed up as being exclusively due to Syrian government brutality. In fact, who is to 
blame would require a genuinely independent inquiry – which is unlikely to ever occur, as 
the subsequent violence has turned the Daraa events into little more than a footnote. 
Transnational War in Syria 205 
 
Romanian Political Science Review  vol. XVI  no. 2  2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
rallies” and “government repression” quickly became the only news worth 
reporting, however. In this context, the Qatar-based and royal family-financed 
Al Jazeera TV station became so one-sided in its news coverage and so 
shameless in pushing freely invented news about events in Syria that many 
journalists resigned in protest from the station and its reputation was damaged 
beyond repair49. 
 In the second period, the Gaddafi regime in Libya was brought down in 
August 2011, following on the NATO bombing campaign. This resulted in the 
proliferation of weapons from Libyan arms depots across the region. In parallel, 
US President Obama demanded in a “rhetorical escalation” on 18 August for 
the first time President Assad’s resignation50. There was a steady increase in the 
levels of violence in Syria that must be attributed – at least to a large extent – to 
the delivery of weapons to the insurgents: 
  
“With help from the C.I.A., Arab governments and Turkey have sharply 
increased their military aid to Syria’s opposition fighters … expanding a secret airlift of 
arms and equipment for the uprising against President Bashar al-Assad …. The airlift, 
which began on a small scale in early 2012 and continued intermittently through last 
fall, expanded into a steady and much heavier flow late last year, the data [based on air 
traffic control] shows”51. 
  
The insurgents generally hoped that the US and/or NATO would 
engage in air strikes to destroy the Assad regime. This hope was due to the 
sponsorship of western governments for meetings of the so-called “Friends of 
Syria”. During these meetings, western government officials mingled with 
Syrian opposition groups that were financed by the Sunni states and controlled 
                                                                                                                       
Crucially, subsequent political developments in places as different as Egypt, Ukraine, or 
Turkey have shown that the contest for power in the streets quickly produces an 
escalation of violence and is manipulated by domestic and international actors. In places 
other than Syria, this has not been used to vindicate the large-scale arming of insurgents. 
49
  V.P. Haran, “Roots of the Syrian Crisis”, IPCS Special Report 181, March 2016, New 
Delhi: Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, http://www.ipcs.org/ 
pdf_file/issue/RootsoftheSyrianCrisis_VPHaran.pdf (accessed July 20, 2016), p. 11. 
50
  S. Wilson, J. Warrick, “Assad Must Go, Obama Says”, Washington Post, August 18, 2011. 
51
  C.J. Chivers, E. Schmitt, “Arms Airlift to Syria Rebels Expands, With Aid From C.I.A.”, 
New York Times, March 24, 2013, emphasis added. The two quoted Times journalists 
failed to follow up on their own story, which subsequently dropped from public attention. 
The same paper has ever since, especially between 2013 and 2015, been filled with 
reporting about “non-lethal aid” to the insurgents and other disinformation. Clearly, the 
role of the Times as the “paper of record” in the Syrian crisis has been the opposite of 
what it claims to do, i.e. news about the possibly largest ever covert action of the CIA in 
alliance with other intelligence agencies in the Middle East and the large-scale spending 
that was undertaken in pursuit of regime change in Syria is only covered after the event, 
reluctantly, and in response to other sources that have already removed “plausible 
deniability”. 
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by their intelligence agencies. However, the decision of EU states to recognize 
claims of such bodies to form the “legitimate government of Syria” never 
produced any political unity on the part of the opposition. Instead, the 
opposition bodies subsequently dropped from international attention and have 
not had any impact on the situation within Syria since then. A new climax in the 
crisis was reached on 18 July when the Syrian Defense Secretary, Deputy 
Defense Secretary and others died in an explosion in Damascus. On 19 July, the 
battle for Aleppo started when insurgents entered the city from the surrounding 
countryside. This subsequently resulted in the large-scale devastation of Syria’s 
largest city that had not previously been affected by the violence elsewhere. The 
western media discourse by now suggested that the Syrian regime was about to 
dissolve due to defections, while the Syrian army was claimed to break up along 
sectarian lines, with the Sunni sections turning against the regime. 
 In the third period between August 2012 and June 2013, it became clear 
that the Syrian government did in fact not suffer any significant defections. 
Moreover, the Syrian army, increasingly backed up by Hezbollah and rising 
numbers of pro-government militias, continued the fight against the insurgency 
despite of very high casualty rates. The period started with US President 
Obama’s announcement, in August 2012, of a “red line” in case of the Syrian 
government’s use of chemical weapons that would change his “calculus” on the 
conflict. There were subsequently many claims by the insurgents that Syrian 
government forces had used chemical weapons on the battlefield, but none of 
these claims was backed up by conclusive evidence. The recapture of the 
strategic city of Qusayr in June 2013 by the Syrian army and Hezbollah “raised 
fears in Washington that large parts of the rebellion could be on the verge of 
collapse”52. This potential turning point in the conflict resulted in a major push 
on the part of the US and the Sunni states to resupply the insurgents with new 
weapons. These weapons deliveries were now also publicly acknowledged for the 
first time; although they had already been in place since at least January 2012. 
Between August and December 2013, the war escalated further and it 
appeared that direct US intervention with airstrikes on Syrian government 
targets, or even clashes between the US and Russia over Syria, would be 
possible. The US and Russia engaged in parallel in a naval build-up on the 
Syrian coast. At the same time, claims about the use of chemical weapons on 
the part of the Syrian government further proliferated in the western media, 
while other observers of the situation in Syria pointed out that the insurgents 
might have conquered facilities to produce chemical weapons, or could have 
been supplied with such weapons by Turkish intelligence keen to draw the US 
                                                 
52
  M. Mazzetti, M. Gordon, M. Landler, “U.S. is Said to Plan to Send Weapons to Syrian 
Rebels”, New York Times, June 13, 2013. 
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into direct intervention on the ground53. The major turning point was Obama’s 
apparent willingness to go to war over Syria that was only stopped after the 
surprise diplomatic initiative on the part of Russia to advance a deal between 
Putin and Obama on the decommissioning of the Syrian chemical weapons 
under international supervision. This deal was immediately accepted by the 
Syrian government, on 10 September, and resulted in the subsequent 
decommissioning of these weapons. 
From the Syrian point of view, the handing over of the chemical 
weapons was one-sided, since these weapons had been procured as a deterrent 
against possible ground attacks on the country by the superior Israeli army that 
in turn had access to a large WMD arsenal. With the advantage of hindsight, the 
Syrian leadership acted wisely since the weapons had little value as a deterrent 
and could have potentially fallen into the hands of the insurgents. In any case, 
the deal ended the mutual standoff between the US and Russia and avoided 
further escalation of the conflict in the direction of a large regional or global 
war for the time being. At this point, western analysts had also become fully 
aware that the insurgents were overwhelmingly Islamist, often of non-Syrian 
origin, and that they were not controlled by any set of civilian opposition 
leaders54. Thus, the marketing of a “war for democracy” was no longer credible. 
In 2014, the IS terrorists joined the insurgency in Syria on a larger scale 
and started fighting the Syrian government and other insurgents. In March, the 
“Nusra Front” entered Syria from Turkey and attacked the Syrian-Armenian 
town of Kessab, located in close proximity to the Turkish border. The intense 
collaboration between Turkish intelligence and the Islamist terror groups 
became well-documented, although the western media failed to further inquire 
into these connections. In June 2014, Bashar al-Assad was re-elected in Syria’s 
presidential elections that were characterized by a fairly high degree of popular 
participation. Following the elections, which underlined that the government 
continued to enjoy significant levels of support, the violence further escalated 
and the US started to engage in air strikes against IS in Syria since September 
2014. Since IS had earlier moved into the Syrian oil fields, mostly located in the 
northern Kurdish region of Syria and close to the Iraqi border, these 
                                                 
53
  A. Baker, “Syria’s Civil War. The Mystery Behind a Deadly Chemical Attack”, Time, 
April 1, 2013. Baker’s story is said to be based on interviews with Syrian informers and 
quotes Mohammad Sabbagh, the owner of the “only chlorine gas manufacturing plant in 
Syria” stating that his factory had been occupied by insurgents. This story was not 
followed up in the western media, which has instead relied on sources originating with the 
insurgents, who claimed in turn that the Syrian government had used chemical weapons. 
For the larger context, see S.H. Hersh, “The Red Line and the Rat Line”, London Review 
of Books, April 17, 2014. 
54
  IHS Aerospace, Defense & Security, “Analysis: Syria’s Insurgent Landscape”, September 
2013, http://www.ihs.com/pdfs/Syrias-Insurgent-Landscape-oct-2013.pdf (accessed 
September 1, 2015). 
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bombardments resulted in the destruction of some of Syria’s oil infrastructure, 
thereby further undermining the country’s economic base. 
Next, the period since March 2015 witnessed further adjustment of 
western narratives about the Syrian conflict. First, the capture and subsequent 
large-scale destruction of the historical sites in the ancient Syrian city of 
Palmyra by the IS terrorists (in turn liberated by the Syrian army on 27 March 
2016) showed that the Syrian government and military were increasingly 
weakened. Second, it became obvious that Erdogan’s Turkey had been engaged 
in a long-standing program of arms supplies to the Islamist groups, including 
IS, and had accepted oil smuggling from Syria to Turkey on a large scale, which 
in turn financed IS terrorism55. This was in addition to IS and Nusra Front 
funding from Saudi sources that has been duly acknowledged in the US 
media56. While this support might have proceeded in an indirect manner, by 
supplying groups that in turn supplied IS, it was now clear that IS received its 
logistical and military supplies from networks in Turkey and Iraq. These 
networks were in turn connected with other conservative Sunni states on the 
financial, military, and intelligence planes. They all worked in turn closely with 
the CIA in coordinating the exchange of intelligence. In addition, the US 
provided a budget “approaching 1 billion dollar a year” for training of its own 
sets of “rebels” and amounting to “roughly 100.000 dollar per year for every 
anti-Assad rebel who has gone through the program”57. 
                                                 
55
  D.L. Philips, “Research Paper: ISIS-Turkey Links”, Institute for the Study of Human 
Rights, Columbia University, September 11, 2015, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-
l-phillips/research-paper-isis-turke_b_6128950.html (accessed July 20, 2016). 
56
  B. Norton, “Saudi Arabia Funds and Exports Islamic Extremism: The Truth behind the 
Toxic U.S. Relationship with the Theocratic Monarchy”, Salon, January 7, 2016, 
http://www.salon.com/2016/01/06/saudi_arabia_funds_and_exports_islamic_extremism_t
he_truth_behind_the_toxic_u_s_relationship_with_the_theocratic_nation/ (accessed July 
20, 2016). 
57
  The US-funded “moderate rebels”, such as the “First FSA Battalion”, have in the 
meantime disappeared into the Syrian insurgency landscape. The very high amount of US 
funding that is unaccounted for in the context of support of “moderates” in CIA-led 
“train-and-equip” programs in 2013 and 2014 left one US general, Lloyd Austin III, in 
doubt whether “four or five” fighters were still under the guidance of the US authorities. 
See A.S. Ahmed, “Only ‘4 or 5’ U.S.-Trained Rebels in Syria? Not Exactly”, Huffington 
Post, September 16, 2015, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/four-five-fighters-
pentagon-syria_us_55f9ad27e4b0d6492d63ed49 (accessed July 20, 2016); G. Miller, 
K. DeYoung, “Secret CIA Effort in Syria Faces Large Funding Cut”, Washington Post, 
June 12, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/lawmakers-
move-to-curb-1-billion-cia-program-to-train-syrian-rebels/2015/06/12/b0f45a9e-1114-
11e5-adec-e82f8395c032_story.html (accessed July 20, 2016). The point here is not to 
stress perceived incompetency on the part of the CIA, or the complete lack of 
accountability over large amounts of funding for covert action that was noted but not 
sanctioned by observers in the US Congress. Rather, it appears more likely that the 
training of “moderate” insurgents was little more than a sideshow for other kinds of 
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This increased transparency about the role of Turkey and its intelligence 
agencies in the logistical and military supply of the Syrian insurgency was in 
turn partially due to a battle of different currents within the Turkish state 
apparatus. On the one hand, Erdogan and his Justice and Development party (an 
organization with close links to the Muslim Brotherhood in other countries) 
used the resources of the Turkish state to supply the Syrian insurgency with 
military and logistical support. On the other hand, the three other main political 
parties in Turkey all oppose Erdogan’s Syria policy, and he has also fallen out 
with the Gülen movement, a Sunni religious reform group named after its leader 
Fethullah Gülen. The latter used to collaborate with Erdogan but has been 
opposed to him in recent years. This conflict produced in turn a campaign by 
Erdogan to exclude Gülen supporters from the state apparatus, which took off 
after a 2013 effort of Turkish prosecutors, claimed to be close to Gülen, to start 
inquiries into corruption among Erdogan’s close collaborators.  
It also resulted in Erdogan’s decision to take over Zaman, a Turkish 
newspaper with links to Gülen and a remarkably well-balanced editorial line on 
the Syrian conflict in its English-language edition Today’s Zaman, on March 4, 
2016, in order to turn it into a government mouthpiece. Apart from arresting 
journalists, the Turkish government also swiftly dismantled the papers online 
presence, which showed the strength of the Turkish authorities in 
“unpublishing” unwanted news coverage. One of the main reasons for 
Erdogan’s decision to repress the opposition media has been the latter’s 
coverage of the delivery of weapons by the Turkish MIT intelligence service to 
the Islamist insurgents in Syria58. News coverage of conflicts between the MIT 
and the regular Turkish police force over weapons hidden in delivery vans 
driven by MIT personnel on the Turkish side of Syria’s border resulted in the 
arrest of the Cumhuriyet journalists Can Dündar and Erdem Gül, among 
others59. In June 2016, Erdogan’s party used its majority in parliament to 
remove parliamentary immunity from anti-Erdogan parliamentarians, altogether 
a third of all lawmakers. This move targeted in particular the pro-Kurdish 
People’s Democratic Party (HDP).  
                                                                                                                       
supplies of the actual insurgency. One can only hope that the history of recent CIA 
activities in Syria might be written by a self-critical participant at some future point. 
58
  No stated author, “Turkish Court Arrest 17 Soldiers who Stopped Syria-bound 
Intelligence Trucks”, Hürriyet, April 10, 2015, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/ 
turkish-court-arrests-17-soldiers-who-stopped-syria-bound-intelligence-
trucks.aspx?PageID=238&NID=80872&NewsCatID=509 (accessed July 20, 2016). 
59
  According to another prosecuted Turkish journalist, Arzu Yıldız, “the government can 
manipulate everything, the pictures, the media and so on. But the reports I have authored 
are the official evidence that the government has delivered weapons to Dschihadist groups 
in Syria”. E. Caylan, “Druck auf Journalisten: Die Waffen des Staates”, taz.de, May 27, 
2016 (accessed July 20, 2016). 
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Finally, the Turkish coup events of 15 July 2016, described by Erdogan 
as a “gift from Allah”, have triggered what amounts to the largest political 
cleansing operation in recent Turkish memory with dismissals and arrests of 
tens of thousands in the Turkish army, police force, legal and education system, 
and virtually all other branches of the Turkish state. At least two dozen 
newspapers and websites have been closed down and Erdogan’s assertion that 
these moves target Gülen supporters serves as a convenient fig leaf. In fact, the 
repression is so enormous that it cannot be explained by efforts to go after those 
involved in the coup, and lists of “enemies of the state” that are being “purged” 
are so extensive that they must have been prepared long in advance of recent 
events. While Erdogan currently appears to be back in the driving seat, not least 
due to his militant Islamist support base in the streets, he also appears to have 
lost all sense of self-control and does no longer pretend to offer anything other 
than authoritarian rule. His Syria policy remains a failure and his dilemma about 
whether to continue to target the Syrian government or to focus more on 
repression of Kurdish nationalism still remains in place. 
The outcome of the Syrian tragedy as it stands today is as follows: the 
arming of the Syrian insurgency has been coordinated by Washington acting in 
its traditional role as principal of the conservative Sunni regimes since at least 
the beginning of 2012. The US media has failed to report adequately on US 
policy – with minor improvements since 2016, especially due to the 
countervailing role played by Russia in Syria – and has instead been keen to 
follow up on made-up news about the supply of “moderate” rebels with so-
called “non-lethal assistance”. In a debunking of the official US media 
discourse, worth quoting at length, it was pointed out that: 
  
“[T]he scale of the material aid reportedly delivered to the armed Syrian 
opposition by the U.S. and its allies…dwarfs anything discussed in the government’s 
public narrative. Exact figures are not available…but a few comparisons are 
illuminating. The delivery of just twelve antitank missile launchers to Harakat Hazm 
[so-called ‘moderate’ insurgents] consumed nearly a month of press coverage in the 
public narrative in early 2014. In contrast, if the figures from SIPRI [Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute] are to be trusted, the CIA helped organize the 
airlift of 3,500 tons of heavy weaponry in a single operation from January 2012-March 
2013”60.  
 
The same author suggested that the difference between the public 
narrative about reluctant US involvement in Syria and the reality of US direct 
and indirect arming of the insurgency was due to the following reason: 
 
                                                 
60
  J. Veldkamp, “Narrative and Reality in United States Aid to the Syrian Armed 
Opposition: 2012-2014”, paper presented at the 2015 Middle East History and Theory 
Conference, University of Chicago, May 1-2, 2015, p. 11, original emphasis. 
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“If the U.S. began cautiously trickling arms to trusted groups in Syria in June 
or September 2013, after nearly two and a half years of civil war, then it is a responsible 
actor grappling with a difficult situation. If the U.S. helped deliver thousands of tons of 
weapons to the opposition from (at least) nearly the beginning of the armed conflict, an 
opposition that quickly became dominated by extremists, then it is a party to a vicious 
proxy war with sectarian overtones”61.  
 
In the context of US strategy on Syria, all local Sunni regimes (Turkey, 
Saudi Arabia, and Qatar) have been weakened by their lengthy and so far failed 
campaign to destroy the Syrian regime. In the case of the latter two states, this 
weakening has been acknowledged by the retirement of the older generation 
within the royal courts and their replacement with a younger generation of 
princes. In the case of Erdogan, his political survival appears to depend on 
escalating the conflict with Kurdish nationalists in order to produce a Turkish 
national unity wave to keep him in office. The very fact that this “plan” has 
been discussed at length in the until the beginning of 2016 still relatively free 
Turkish media makes his long-term success less likely, although he might 
succeed in turning Turkey into a garrison state.  
As for Russia, Iran, and the Baghdad government in Iraq, these 
countries are aware that a breakdown of the Syrian state would issue in a failed 
state and would result in the break-up of the geopolitical alliance that has kept 
Syria out of the western sphere of influence since the mid-1950s. The 
breakdown of the Syrian regime would also question the continuing existence 
of Iraq as a unified state, would result in efforts to remove the Hezbollah 
movement as a significant political factor in Lebanon, and would put further 
pressure on Iran. In any case, the destruction of the regional power balance 
would issue in new conflicts that would further weaken all regional powers 
other than Israel. 
 
 
Conclusion: From the Eisenhower Doctrine 
to the Transnational War in Syria 
  
The conflict in Syria since 2011 has turned into the most dramatic 
power contest in post-Cold War history. It points to the continuity and further 
escalation of local, regional, and global geopolitical conflict in the 21st century 
and questions humanity’s ability to use the remaining global resources in a 
manner that will sustain a future worth living. At the moment of writing, the 
outcome of the crisis is the multi-dimensional destruction of Syria. To put it 
differently, what is being fought over has been broken and humanity’s heritage, 
                                                 
61
  Ibidem, p. 14. 
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as represented by Syria’s unique past going back to the earliest high cultures, is 
being dismantled. What is the ultimate reason for this disaster? 
 The geopolitical view suggests that disturbances in the balance of 
power issue in conflicts if actors believe that they can realize gains at the 
expense of others. In the Syrian context, there are multiple starting points to 
explain why the domestic actors in Syria have become victims of forces that are 
related to the larger regional and global planes. These start with the direct 
political environment of Syria, i.e. the Zionist colonization in neighboring 
Palestine and the foundation of the Zionist state as an ally of the US, when the 
latter emerged as the new main power in the Middle East in the post-WW2 
period. Syria therefore lacked a geopolitical patron in the period between 
decolonization and the emergence of the Cold War in the Middle East. This left 
the country vulnerable in comparison to most of its neighbors and triggered the 
subsequent alignment with the weaker of the two superpowers, the Soviet 
Union, due to the lack of any viable alternative62. The demise of the Soviet 
Union in 1991 once again resulted in the loss of geopolitical patronage for Syria 
and the decision of US policymakers to destroy the Iraqi Baath regime appeared 
to further isolate Syria in the region. Last but not least, the long-standing effort 
on the part of Israel to “deconstruct” Syria and Iraq, the two last Arab contender 
states still challenging Israel’s conquest of Arab lands, must be seen as crucial 
to understand how Syria’s internal conflict has played out. 
 What, then, explains the escalation of the Syrian conflict from a 
geopolitical point of view? To be sure, any singling out of “main factors” is 
bound to reduce complexity and fails to fully represent reality. However, it is 
possible to deduce a hierarchy of motivational factors to explain the behavior of 
the seven most important state executives with regard to the Syrian conflict, 
namely of the US, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar, and Israel on the side of the 
challengers of the Syrian regime; and of Iran and Russia on the side of its 
defenders (see Table 2). 
                                                 
62
 For an account of Syria’s turn to the Soviet Union, see J.M Dostal, “Syria and the Great 
Powers (1946-1958): How Western Power Politics Pushed the Country Toward the Soviet 
Union”, Syria Studies, vol. 7, no. 4, 2015, pp. 7-52, https://ojs.st-
andrews.ac.uk/index.php/syria/issue/viewIssue/127/1 (accessed July 20, 2016). 
 Table 2 
Geopolitical Goals of Seven Countries in the Syrian Conflict 
 
 (1) US (2) Saudi Arabia (3) Turkey (4) Qatar (5) Israel (6) Iran (7) Russia 
Ideal result (first 
preference) 
replacement of Assad regime with 
Sunni pro-US regime 
replacement of Assad regime with 
Sunni-Wahhabist regime 
replacement of Assad regime with 
Muslim Brotherhood regime 
replacement of Assad 
regime with Muslim 
Brotherhood regime 
split-up of Syria into cantons 
along ethnic and sectarian lines 
protection of Iran's position in Syria 
protection of Russia's 
position in Syria 
Acceptable result 
(second 
preference)  
break-up of the triple alliance 
between Syria, Iraq and Iran  
same same same same 
maintenance of triple alliance 
between Syria, Iraq, and Iran 
Collaboration with the 
triple alliance as a 
means to check US 
regional dominance 
 
 
a very weak Syria that ceases to be a 
local geopolitical actor 
same same same same maintenance of a unified Syrian state 
maintenance of a 
unified Syrian state 
Other important 
factor 
increasing level of arms sales to the 
Arab oil monarchies 
anti-Shia campaign across the Middle 
East 
creation of a Turkish-controlled 
buffer zone in Syria to control 
Kurdish nationalism: avoidance of 
'de-facto 'Kurdish state 
 
 
maintenance of lobbying power 
with US state executives 
improvement of Iran's bargaining 
politics in the Middle East and with 
the great powers 
improvement of 
Russia's bargaining 
position in the Middle 
East 
 
 
 tactical use of some sectors of 
Kurdish Nationalism 
military build-up against Iran     
maintanance of regional military 
dominance 
strengthening of the triple alliance 
with Iraq and Syria to balance Saudi 
Arabia 
maintenance of Syria 
as Russia’s oldest 
geopolitical ally (since 
1955) in the Middle 
East  
 
 
 pipeline projects across Syrian 
territory 
same same same 
continuation of the occupation of 
the Syrian Golan Hights 
 
 
 
 
Actual results until 
July 2016 
failure to turn local 'moderate rebels' 
into a significant force 
military overstretch (Yemen) 
underlines military weakness 
destruction of Syria's economy 
removes potential economic 
competitor 
decline of soft power due to 
the loss of credibility of Al 
Jazeera 
further strengthening of Israeli 
military superiority 
further strengthening of Iran's 
position with Bagdad government 
introduction of 
Russia's naval force 
into the Mediterranean 
 
increased power over conservative 
Sunni states 
potential spillover of external failure 
to the domestic polity 
new war against Kurdish nationalism 
in Turkey, Syria and Iraq 
loss of regional influence 
due to the failure of the 
Muslim Brotherhood ally in 
Egypt 
further expansion of Jewish 
settlements in the occupied 
territories 
increase in regional geopolitical 
strength 
Russia exercises 
diplomatic leadership 
on Syria 
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From the point of view of today’s US policymakers, the main factor that 
points back to the Eisenhower Doctrine is the effort to defend the country’s 
position as major, and ideally only, external balancer in the Middle East. In the 
current context, the main danger for the US regional position would be the 
consolidation of the triple alliance between Syria, Iraq, and Iran that was in turn 
only made possible due to the US decision, under the Bush, Jr. administration, 
to take out Saddam’s Sunni regime in Iraq. Yet the 2003 invasion triggered the 
rise of a Shia-dominated and largely pro-Iranian Iraqi government. This 
development provided the missing link for the geopolitical emergence of a land 
bridge reaching from Syria via Iraq to Iran and from the Mediterranean to the 
Persian Gulf. Further consolidation of the triple alliance would certainly be the 
worst case scenario from the US point of view, amounting to full-scale 
geopolitical failure in the region63. Thus, the tactical withdrawal of most US 
troops from Iraq during the second Obama presidency – that has by now been 
reversed in the context of “fighting IS” – made the effort to “turn” Syria and to 
break it from its allies all the more urgent. (In this context, many US 
policymakers still remember how they regained control of Egypt in the late 
1970s and would like to repeat the scenario.)  
For the US, the ideal outcome of the Syrian war would be the 
construction of a regional system in the Middle East, in which all Arab state 
units would have to accept permanent US military bases. While such full-scale 
military cover would not question the ability of other major powers, particularly 
China, to enter the Middle East on the economic plane, it would make these 
powers depend on previous agreements with the US as the guaranteeing power. 
The US instrument to achieve and defend regional hegemony in the Middle East 
is the continuation of the asymmetric alliance system, first and foremost with 
Israel and secondly with the Sunni states and Turkey. As in the past, this system 
remains balanced in favor of Israel. Overall, the US much prefer weak allies to 
strong ones, and this attitude certainly also applies to the relationship with EU 
states. The latter have played only a very limited role in the Middle East and 
have mostly followed the US line to the letter.  
 Looking in turn at the goals of the conservative Sunni alliance made up 
of Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, it is important to recognize that the US has 
no fixed preference with regard to future Syrian domestic arrangements, other 
than the installment of a new Syrian leadership that stops to challenge US 
regional objectives. On the other hand, the Sunni states are divided between 
those supporting a Muslim Brotherhood-type political leadership in Syria (Qatar 
and Turkey) and Saudi Arabia, which would prefer the export of its own system 
                                                 
63
  J.M. Dostal, “Syria and Iraq: The Long-Term Cost of Geopolitical Destabilisation”, 
Panorama: Insights into Asian and European Affairs, 1/2015, Singapore, Konrad 
Adenauer Stiftung, pp. 173-195, http://media.wix.com/ugd/fb1673_ebcb4bee 
5b68415799304e7ecf1d2f1a.pdf (accessed July 20, 2016). 
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of Wahhabism. This lack of a unified political project of the Sunni states means 
that all three powers are actually fairly weak in projecting their power into 
Syria. At present, sponsorship of a large number of Islamist militias operating 
on the Syrian battlefield only works to underline the absence of political 
agreement about the future of Syria. Removing Syria from the triple alliance 
with Iraq and Iran would theoretically allow the Saudi and Qatari pipeline 
projects to go ahead. Constructing such pipeline across Syrian territory to reach 
Turkey would in turn potentially strengthen the Sunni states. However, the 
large-scale destruction of Syria makes any kind of oil or gas pipeline project 
utopian for the foreseeable future. In fact, the conservative Sunni states by now 
(in 2016) try to cut their geopolitical losses rather than to realize any 
conceivable gains.  
From the US perspective, failure on the part of the conservative Sunni 
states to impose their regional agenda is of no serious concern, since a policy of 
divide-and-rule suggests that weaker regional Sunni leaderships serve the 
objective of strengthen the US veto position and regional leadership role. 
Weakening allies might serve this purpose just as much as the weakening of 
opponents. This is what Spykman recommended in terms of a geopolitical 
“pluralism” in the Eurasian rimlands, i.e. the region that includes Syria and all 
her regional opponents, when he stated that “[w]ho controls the rimland rules 
Eurasia; who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world”64. 
From the Israeli point of view, the ideal outcome of the Syrian war 
would be the division of the country along ethnic and sectarian lines. This was 
openly acknowledged in the country’s media as recently as September 2015. In 
this context, Israel could consider – jointly with the US – to support some 
faction of Kurdish nationalism, especially with regard to a potential future 
division of Syria and Iraq. On the other hand, Israel does not have to do 
anything and can just stay put, as the ongoing Syrian war weakens all other 
regional powers. Ultimately, the Israeli position depends less on regional factors 
and more on maintaining a strong position in dealings with the US core 
executive – this remains Israel’s most crucial concern in the current context. It 
is already very likely that the next US President (probably Clinton II or Trump) 
will follow the example of the Obama administration and will not put any 
pressure on Israel to stop its ongoing policy of expansion of settlements in the 
occupied Palestinian territories.  
                                                 
64
  N.J. Spykman, The Geography…cit., (footnote 3), p. 43. For a recent evaluation of 
Spykman’s ideas about how the US should maintain “balance” in the Eurasian rimlands, 
see also N. Hoffmann, Renaissance der Geopolitik? Die deutsche Sicherheitspolitik nach 
dem Kalten Krieg, Verlag fūr Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden, 2012, pp. 36-37. 
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As for the opposing camp, namely the triple alliance of Syria, Iraq, and 
Iran, these states must defend the status quo and will aim to further strengthen 
their alliance. In some respect, they are outnumbered on the military and 
financial planes in comparison with the conservative Sunni states. The same 
applies to Russia as the weaker of the two external balancers in the Middle East, 
which is merely trying to sustain the Syrian government as its most long-
standing Arab ally. Yet one should not underestimate the relative strength that 
is still available to these states at the local, regional, and global level. This has 
been underlined by the Russian military intervention on the side of the Syrian 
government in late 2015 and early 2016 that has weakened the Islamist groups, 
especially the “Islamic State” (IS) terrorist organization, and prepared the 
ground for the liberation of the Syrian city of Palmyra by the Syrian army. In 
addition, a unified Iraq, based on mutually satisfying domestic agreements 
between Sunnis, Shias, and Kurds, could allow this country to quickly recover 
as the major Arab state in the region. In fact, Iraqi oil production has reached 
record levels in recent years, regardless of the IS terrorism, and the country 
could quickly consolidate its position in the regional context if it were to regain 
domestic stability.  
In addition, Iran’s signing of an agreement with the Obama 
administration on nuclear issues in July 2015, immediately challenged by 
Republicans in Congress and the Israel Lobby in the US, is not worth much as a 
“bargaining chip”. In fact, the Iranian leadership is unlikely to place much faith 
in agreements that are not backed up by its own local and regional strength. The 
governments in Damascus, Bagdad, and Tehran are convinced that a defeat in 
Syria would result in the proliferation of Islamist insurgency across the region 
and new conflicts elsewhere.  
Summing up the Syrian transnational war, it is based on the logic of 
“the proxies of my proxies against the proxies of your proxies”. This has 
become abundantly clear in the writings of US-based analysts. The recent 
publication of a 2012 memo of the Defense Intelligence Agency, predicting the 
rise of IS and, at the same time, the likelihood of President Bashar al-Assad to 
remain in control of a core region of Syria, which went against everything 
issued by US policymakers in public at the time, is a case in point65. This also 
applies to the casual and honest statement that “the vast majority of the Syrian 
insurgency has coordinated closely with Al-Qaeda since mid-2012”66. Such 
                                                 
65
  Defense Intelligence Agency, 14-L-0552/DIA/ 287 [i.e. August 12, 2012 DIA memo on 
the expected future development of the Syrian conflict], 
http://www.judicialwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Pg.-291-Pgs.-287-293-JW-v-
DOD-and-State-14-812-DOD-Release-2015-04-10-final-version11.pdf (accessed July 20, 
2016). 
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  C. Lister, “Are Syrian Islamists moving to counterbalance Al-Qaeda? Will it last?”, 
March 23, 2015, Brookings Middle East Politics & Policy, 
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voices in the US discourse underline that the current chapter of the Eisenhower 
Doctrine (which was in turn a practical application of the ideas of Spykman) 
does not need “International Communism” any more to vindicate endless 
rounds of US regional intervention. 
Finally, the transnational war in Syria has entered its sixth year and its 
outcome is impossible to predict at the moment of writing in July 2016. This 
conflict must be in many ways understood as the continuation of the 2003 US 
and UK occupation of Iraq and as another chapter in the efforts of the western 
powers, especially the US, to keep their regional veto role in the Arab world at 
almost any cost. Just as in the case of Iraq, the tendency is to turn war into a 
chronic condition, deliver arms to many actors, produce lengthy regional 
standoffs, and demoralize the local population. 
These new kinds of transnational war in the Middle East differ in style 
and substance from the earlier conflicts between Israel and the Arabs that were 
mostly fought in short bursts. Nevertheless, and the extreme degrees of current 
violence notwithstanding, the study of regional Arab and Greater Middle East 
history suggests on balance that the most likely outcome of Syria’s 
transnational war will be the restoration of the regional status quo, i.e. the 
reestablishment of two sets of regional alliances that balance against each other. 
One certain outcome of the Syrian conflict is to weaken all involved regional 
actors other than Israel. Once the regional actors have wasted their potential by 
fighting each other, external intervention will once again become more likely. 
The recent insertion of US, British, French, and Turkish special forces into 
Syria, in the air and/or on the ground, gives an idea about what to expect in the 
future. The cycle of violence is clearly fed by geopolitical contestation and 
threatens to turn the 21st century into a dark age for the Arabs and their 
neighbors. Since Europe is not one ocean removed from the Arab world, it will 
also pay a heavy price. 
 
                                                                                                                       
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2015/03/23-syrian-islamists-balancing-
with-alqaeda-lister (accessed July 20, 2016). 
